Harnessing Virtual Reality to Prevent Prosecutorial Misconduct by Bloch, Kate
University of California, Hastings College of the Law 
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship 
2019 
Harnessing Virtual Reality to Prevent Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Kate Bloch 
UC Hastings College of the Law, blochk@uchastings.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship 
Recommended Citation 
Kate Bloch, Harnessing Virtual Reality to Prevent Prosecutorial Misconduct, 32 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1 
(2019). 
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1720 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu. 
ARTICLES
Harnessing Virtual Reality to Prevent Prosecutorial
Misconduct
KATE E. BLOCH*
ABSTRACT
Prosecutorial failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence has put inno-
cent people on death row and left others languishing in prison for decades. More
than half a century ago, in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires prosecutors in criminal cases
to disclose such evidence to the defense. Scholars now attribute much of this fail-
ure to cognitive biases, which can cause distortions in information processing.
This Article proposes a novel approach for preventing such prosecutorial error.
Applying recent advances in cognitive science research, the Article explores
the potential for immersive virtual experiences to disrupt cognitive biases.
Disrupting such biases could enable prosecutors to more effectively see the ex-
culpatory nature of evidence and be inclined to disclose that evidence. If the
power of digital avatars can be harnessed for this purpose, avatars may reinforce
or re-introduce self-regulation as a first line of defense against Brady violations.
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INTRODUCTION
It was the confession of a man facing death, but not the man convicted of the
capital crime.1 This confession came from the terminally ill prosecutor, whose
suppression of evidence many years earlier had helped put the accused on death
row. 2 In Connick v. Thompson, a prosecutor admitted deliberately withholding
evidence, evidence that would subsequently lead to the exoneration of the
accused.3
Prosecutorial failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence can violate the
U.S. Constitution and undermine justice. The Supreme Court's decision in Brady
v. Maryland, which gave voice to this constitutional requirement, dates to 1963,
more than half a century ago.4 Yet, court cases, like Connick, and related investi-
gations bear witness to the continuing practice and detrimental consequences of
such prosecutorial failure to disclose.' As Brady focuses on the consequence to
1. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,55 56 (2011); id. at 83 90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2. Thompson, 563 U.S. at 55 56,56 n.1; id. at 83 90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3. Thompson, 563 U.S. at 76 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 83 90 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
4. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
5. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRiB. (Jan. 11, 1999), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial 1 -story.html [https://perma.cc/SW46-4DD5]; see
also People v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 631 32 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of petition
for rehearing en banc) (citing Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012); United States v. Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885
(9th Cir. 2013); Aguilar v. Woodford, 725 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Kohring, 637 F.3d 895
(9th Cir. 2011); Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2009); Douglas v. Workman, 560 F.3d 1156 (10th
Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Zomber, 299 F. App'x.
130 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Triumph Capital Grp., Inc., 544 F.3d 149 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v.
Aviles-Colon, 536 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008); Horton v. Mayle, 408 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Sipe,
388 F.3d 471 (5th Cir. 2004); Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286 (4th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lyons, 352
F. Supp. 2d 1231 (M.D. Fla. 2004); Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Ind. 2000); United States v.
Dollar, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ala. 1998); People v. Uribe, 76 Cal. Rptr. 3d 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008);
Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094 (D.C. 2011); Deren v. State, 15 So. 3d 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (per
curiam); Walker v. Johnson, 646 S.E.2d 44 (Ga. 2007); Aguilera v. State, 807 N.W.2d 249 (Iowa 2011);
DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97 (Iowa 2011); Commonwealth v. Bussell, 226 S.W.3d 96 (Ky. 2007); State
ex rel. Engel v. Dormire, 304 S.W.3d 120 (Mo. 2010) (en banc); Duley v. State, 304 S.W.3d 158 (Mo. Ct. App.
2009); People v. Garrett, 964 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013), rev'd, 23 N.Y.3d 878 (2014); Pena v. State,
353 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); In re Stenson, 276 P.3d 286 (Wash. 2012); State v. Youngblood, 650
S.E.2d 119 (W. Va. 2007)). But see Jerry P. Coleman & Jordan Lockey, Brady "Epidemic" Misdiagnosis:
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the accused, rather than on the mental state of the prosecutor, Brady condemns
the failure to disclose whether it is in good or bad faith.6
Recent scholarship on Brady error suggests that prosecutorial failure to dis-
close may often stem from cognitive processes that limit the prosecutor's aware-
ness of the exculpatory nature of the evidence at issue or the importance of
disclosing it.' A substantial body of empirical evidence documents this phenom-
enon of cognitive bias generally.8 Research in this domain has identified dozens
of varieties of cognitive bias.9 These mental processes may manifest explicitly or
Claims of Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Sanctions to Deter It, 50 U.S.F. L. REv. 199, 243, 207 08 (2016)
(analyzing the 29 cases and opining:
There is a problem with Brady violations, but it is not an epidemic....
[T]he most telling analysis of the twenty-nine cases is distinguishing the manner of, or cause
behind, the suppression. This evaluation makes a moral or at least scholarly distinction, whether
the suppression was done intentionally, recklessly, negligently, or not at all. The manner of sup-
pression informs both the opprobrium to which an honest researcher can attach to the prosecution,
as well as suggests the types of remedies to correct against future abuse. It also clearly draws a line
between prosecutorial "misconduct," as is universally decried, and mere trial "error"
Viewed through this final lens, the statistical presence of these categories of manner of suppression
among the total population can be discerned as follows: thirteen cases (45%) comprise intentional
suppression, which occurs where the prosecution was aware of exculpatory or impeaching evi-
dence, yet willfully withheld it from the defense. Four cases (14%) can be fairly characterized as
reckless, where the trial prosecutor was not personally aware of the favorable evidence, but will-
fully ignored his duty to search out such evidence in the files of his own office or partner investiga-
tive agencies. Another four cases (14%) were simply too unclear to make a definitive conclusion
as to manner of suppression. Seven cases (24%) represent mere negligent suppression, meaning
the prosecution was unaware of the favorable evidence, which was either actively withheld from it
by a law enforcement partner or the evidence was hidden in a totally-unrelated investigation.
Finally, one of the Kozinski 29 cases (3%) was reversed on appeal after Judge Kozinski noted it in
his Olsen dissent (the final court to rule on the matter found no suppression by the prosecution, i.e.,
no Brady violation). (footnotes omitted)).
6. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an
accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irre-
spective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.").
7. For discussions of cognitive bias research applied to prosecutorial Brady decision making, see e.g., Hadar
Aviram, Legally Blind: Hyperadversarialism, Brady Violations and the Prosecutorial Organizational Culture,
87 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1 (2013); Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One's Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel
Vision, 49 How. L.J. 475 (2006); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons
of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1587, 1593 (2006) (exploring four specific types of cognitive
bias) [hereinafter Burke, Improving]; Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors,
2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Neutralizing]; Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott,
The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. REv. 291, 307 22 (2006); Ellen
Yaroshefsky, Why Do Brady Violations Happen: Cognitive Bias and Beyond, THE CHAMPION, May 2013, at
12. Cognitive bias is, of course, not the sole explanation available or offered by scholars to explain Brady error.
See e.g., id.
8. For a thoughtful analysis of a host of cognitive bias studies and their potential application to the prosecu-
torial context, see Burke, Improving, supra note 7 and Findley & Scott, supra note 7. See generally, e.g., Craig
A. Anderson, Inoculation and Counterexplanation: Debiasing Techniques in the Perseverance of Social
Theories, 1 Soc. COGNITION 126 (1982).
9. The Benson & Manoogian III Wikipedia Cognitive Bias Codex gives a sense of the variety of identified
types of such bias. Buster Benson & John Manoogian III, Cognitive Bias Codex, https://upload.wikimedia.org/
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implicitly or both. Researchers often categorize explicit bias as attitudes of which
the individual has self-awareness, and which are commonly measured by self-
reporting. 0 In contrast, although definitions vary somewhat, scholars describe
implicit bias as involving "evaluations that are automatically activated by the
mere presence (actual or symbolic) of the attitude object and commonly function
without a person's full awareness or control."11 Scholars explain that "[i]mplicit
biases may well be dissociated from what we actively and honestly believe.
12
Both explicit and implicit bias may operate in prosecutorial failure-to-disclose
contexts.
Confirmation bias is one example of these types of mental processes.13 Under
the influence of confirmation bias, an individual, generally without conscious
awareness, selects and interprets evidence in a manner that supports the individu-
al's pre-existing viewpoint and undervalues or rejects evidence contrary to this
pre-existing perspective." Confirmation bias can cause prosecutors to miss the
exculpatory quality of evidence or to discount its value, which can lead to failure
to disclose.15
wikipedia/commons/a/a4/The Cognitive Bias Codex - 180%2B biases%2C designed by John Manoogian
III %28jm3%29.png [https://perma.cc/5VFX-MQNT].
10. See, e.g., John F. Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner, Explicit and Implicit Prejudice and
Interracial Interaction, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (2002).
11. Id. at 62 (citing Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: Attitudes,
Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995)). Other scholars explain that "[e]xplicit bias is a
preference deliberately generated and consciously experienced as one's own; implicit bias is an association or
preference that is not consciously generated and is experienced without awareness." Bernice B. Donald &
Sarah E. Redfield, Framing the Discussion, in ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 14 (Sarah E. Redfield ed.,
2017) (citing JERRY KANG, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, IMPLICIT BIAS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS 1 (2009),
http://wp.jerrykang.net.s 110363.gridserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/kang-Implicit-Bias-Primer-for-
courts-09.pdf [https://perma.cc/SVJ6-SD54]); David Faigman, Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado,
Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, Rachel Godsil, Anthony Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin,
Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1129 (2012) ("[Implicit biases] can function
automatically, including in ways that the person would not endorse as appropriate if he or she did have
conscious awareness."). For analyses of research on and the implications of explicit and implicit bias and its
manifestations in the judicial system, among other venues, see ENHANCING JUSTICE: REDUCING BIAS 5
(Sarah E. Redfield ed., 2017).
12. Donald & Redfield, supra note 11, at 14 (endnote omitted).
13. Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REv. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 175, 175 (1998). More generally, "Scholars across many disciplines, from psychology to neuro-
science to law, increasingly acknowledge that much of the decision-making process is 'implicit,' meaning out-
side of our conscious awareness." Julie A. Seaman, Winning Arguments, 41 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 4 (2017).
14. Nickerson, supra note 13, at 175 ("It refers usually to unwitting selectivity in the acquisition and use of
evidence. The line between deliberate selectivity in the use of evidence and unwitting molding of facts to fit
hypotheses or beliefs is a difficult one to draw in practice, but the distinction is meaningful conceptually, and
confirmation bias has more to do with the latter than with the former."). On cognitive bias and motivated rea-
soning in criminal investigations and related contexts, see, e.g., DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS (2012).
15. See, e.g., Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at 1603-04. For an engaging visual that offers a perspective
on categorizing types of cognitive biases, see Benson & Manoogian, supra note 9.
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In the context of Brady error, one might be inclined to associate the concept of
explicit bias with intentional failure to disclose and implicit bias with inadvertent
failure to disclose. However, the concepts of explicit and implicit bias are distinct
from intentional and inadvertent failures to disclose. For example, implicit bias
may contribute to a prosecutor's decision to intentionally withhold evidence the
prosecutor knows is favorable to the defense.16
Finding effective approaches for disrupting cognitive biases that impede
appropriate evaluation of and disclosure of evidence favorable to the defense,
whether those biases manifest in explicit or implicit forms, may be key to pre-
venting Brady constitutional violations. Cognitive science research suggests that
perspective taking, "the process of imagining the world from another person's
perspective, '"17 can modify one's perspective to reduce explicit and implicit cog-
nitive bias and change behavior.18 Advances in such research demonstrate that
perspective taking in virtual reality can be far more potent than traditional per-
spective taking.19 In this medium, walking in the shoes of another is not a
16. For research on the relationship between implicit and explicit processes, see, e.g., Irene V. Blair,
Jennifer E. Ma & Alison P. Lenton, Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereotypes
Through Mental Imagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 837 (2001) (reporting that "[f]ive experi-
ments provided compelling evidence for the moderating influence of mental imagery on implicit stereotypes"
and arguing that "implicit and explicit processes may be more interdependent than previously believed" and
that "[n]ot only can implicit stereotypes influence explicit judgments and behavior, but explicit thoughts and
strategies may also influence implicit stereotypes"). For further discussion of the role implicit bias could play
in intentional nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence, see infra note 108 and accompanying text.
17. Soo Youn Oh, Jeremy Bailenson, Erika Weisz & Jamil Zaki, Virtually Old: Embodied Perspective
Taking and the Reduction of Ageism Under Threat, 60 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 398,399 (2016).
18. See, e.g., id. On the use of avatars to reduce cognitive bias generally and with respect to explicit bias to-
ward elderly persons, see, e.g., Nick Yee & Jeremy Bailenson, Walk a Mile in Digital Shoes: The Impact of
Embodied Perspective-Taking on Reduction of Negative Stereotyping in Immersive Virtual Environments,
Proceedings of PRESENCE 2006: The 9" Annual International Workshop on Presence (Aug. 24-26, 2006),
http://www.nickyee.com/pubs/Yee%20&%2OBailenson%20-%2ODigital%20Shoes%20(2006).pdf [https://
perma.cc/5M6S-XS39]. On the use of avatars to reduce implicit cognitive bias based on race, see, e.g., Domna
Banakou, Parasuram D. Hanumanthu, & Mel Slater, Virtual Embodiment of White People in a Black Virtual
Body Leads to a Sustained Reduction in their Implicit Racial Bias, 10 FRONTIERS HUM. NEUROSCIENCE 1
(2016). But see, e.g., VICTORIA GROOM, JEREMY N. BAILENSON & CLIFFORD NASS, THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL
EMBODIMENT ON RACIAL BIAS IN IMMERSIVE VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS 1 (Psychol. Press 2009), https://vhil.
stanford.edu/mm/2009/groom-racial-embodiment.pdf [https://perma.cc/WSBD-ZMCZ] (finding indicia of no
decrease in bias). On the use of avatars to affect attitudes toward individuals who are homeless, see Fernanda
Herrera, Jeremy Bailenson, Erika Weisz, Elise Ogle & Jamil Zaki, Building Long-Term Empathy: A Large-
Scale Comparison of Traditional and Virtual Reality Perspective- Taking, 13 PLoS ONE 1 (2018). For a
discussion of the potential of virtual reality for social neuroscience research, see, e.g., Thomas D. Parsons,
Andrea Gaggioli & Giuseppe Riva, Virtual Reality for Research in Social Neuroscience, 7 BRAIN SC. 42
(2017).
19. See, e.g., Tabitha C. Peck, Sofia Seinfeld, Salvatore M. Aglioti, & Mel Slater, Putting Yourself in the
Skin of a Black Avatar Reduces Implicit Racial Bias, 22 CONSCIOUSNESS & COGNITION 779 (2013) (study find-
ing greater reduction in racial bias with immersive embodied condition than with traditional mental simulation
perspective taking); Sun Joo (Grace) Ahn, Amanda Minh Tran Le & Jeremy Bailenson, The Effect of Embodied
Experiences on Self-Other Merging, Attitude, and Helping Behavior, 16 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 7 (2013) (third
experiment finding twice the amount of helping behavior with immersive embodied condition than with tradi-
tional mental simulation perspective taking).
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metaphorical exercise. When the immersive embodied virtual experience is
properly designed and produces a genuine sense of presence,21 the human brain
takes just moments to interpret the virtual world as real and for your avatar22 to
effectively become you. 23 In this virtual reality, you are not imagining the world
through another's eyes; you are looking at the world through those eyes.24
Professor Jeremy Bailenson, a pioneer in the field of virtual reality (VR) research,
contends that "VR is far more psychologically powerful than any medium ever
invented. ' 2' This Article explores whether the innovative power of digital avatars
might be harnessed to enable prosecutors to more effectively perceive and appre-
ciate the exculpatory nature of evidence and to be more inclined to disclose that
evidence. If the power of immersive virtual environments (IVEs) can be har-
nessed for that purpose, avatars may reinforce or re-introduce prosecutorial self-
regulation as a first line of defense against Brady violations.26
Part I of this Article chronicles the dictates of Brady and its progeny.27 Part II
details current thinking on essential causes of Brady error. Part III focuses specifi-
cally on cognitive bias and identifies a range of approaches that scholars have
suggested for reducing error that may be linked to cognitive bias. Part IV
describes embodied perspective taking and reviews scientific research on this
type of virtual reality. Part V explains how such virtual experiences might be
applied to prevent Brady violations. Part VI investigates both potential benefits
20. See JEREMY BAILENSON, EXPERIENCE ON DEMAND: WHAT VIRTUAL REALITY is, How IT WORKS, AND
WHAT IT CAN DO, 76 107 (2018).
21. This phenomenon is known as psychological presence. BAILENSON, supra note 20, at 19 ("[Y]our
motor and perceptual systems interact with the virtual world in a manner similar to how they do in the physi-
cal world... Presence is the sine qua non of VR.").
22. James K. Scarborough & Jeremy N. Bailenson, Avatar Psychology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
VIRTUALITY 129, 130 (Mark Grimshaw ed., 2014) ("Graphical forms of online representation have become
known as avatars. Avatars can range from very simple images.., to complex animated 3D forms frequently
anthropomorphized, that is, made to appear roughly human.").
23. For discussions of the "rubber hand illusion" studies that demonstrate "how to induce body transfer into
avatars" and use of a virtual mirror to create that transfer, see BAILENSON, supra note 20, at 84 92. To induce
transfer using the virtual mirror in which participants see and experience themselves as their avatar, research-
ers, for example, "ask[] each subject to walk up to this virtual mirror, spend about 90 seconds gesturing in front
of the mirror, and closely observ[ing] her 'reflection' as it move[s] with her." Id. at 85. Similarly, in a study on
ageism using the virtual mirror, "participants were told, 'For the next minute, look closely at your reflection in
the mirror. This is what you look like to others in the virtual world. Imagine a day in the life of this individual,
looking at the world through her/his eyes and walking through the world in her/his shoes. "' Oh et al., supra
note 17, at 401-02.
24. GROOM ET AL., supra note 18, at 14.
25. BAILENSON, supra note 20, at 6.
26. Recent research on avatars and reducing bias in criminal justice procedures focuses on the question of
using avatars to reduce racial bias. See Natalie Salmanowitz, Unconventional Methods for a Traditional
Setting. The Use of Virtual Reality to Reduce Implicit Racial Bias in the Courtroom, 15 U.N.H. L. REv. 117
(2016) [hereinafter Salmanowitz, Unconventional Methods]; Natalie Salmanowitz, The Impact of Virtual
Reality on Implicit Racial Bias and Mock Legal Decisions, 5 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 174 (2018) [hereinafter
Salmanowitz, Impact of Virtual Reality].
27. There is a rich scholarly literature on Brady error. The Brady-related articles cited in note 7, supra, and
that are cited in the remaining footnotes in this Article represent a subset of that literature.
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and drawbacks of the proposed approach. The conclusion suggests next steps for
testing the proposal.
I. OVERVIEW OF BRADY V. MARYLAND
In Brady, the prosecution declined to disclose to the defense a co-perpetrator's
confession in which the co-perpetrator admitted that he, rather than the defendant,
had been the actual killer in a robbery murder.28 The defense had requested access
to all of the statements by the co-perpetrator and had been made privy to other
statements, but the prosecution had withheld this statement containing the confes-
sion.29 The U.S. Supreme Court concluded "that the suppression by the prosecu-
tion of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where
the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution. "30
Five defining features of Brady emerge as critical to the analysis here. First,
inculpatory evidence is not subject to Brady disclosure; the evidence has to be
"favorable to an accused."31 As a result, in order for a prosecutor to recognize
that the evidence is subject to Brady, the prosecutor must comprehend its favor-
able nature. Second, whether or not the prosecution recognizes the favorable na-
ture of the evidence, if the evidence is later deemed material and exculpatory by a
court or other reviewing authority, the prosecutor is liable for Brady error.3 2
Thus, whether the road to non-disclosure is paved with good or bad intentions,
sanctions can accompany the failure to disclose.33 Third, generally, in order to be
able to comply with Brady, in a practical sense, the prosecution must be aware of
28. Bradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 87; see also United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) ("Nor do we believe the constitutional
obligation is measured by the moral culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecutor. If evidence highly proba-
tive of innocence is in his file, he should be presumed to recognize its significance even if he has actually over-
looked it." (footnote omitted)). The Supreme Court's choice not to distinguish between deliberate violations of
Brady motivated by bad faith and inadvertent non-disclosure despite good faith diligence and to categorize all
Brady error as prosecutorial misconduct is sometimes perceived as problematic from a policy standpoint. Cf.
Coleman & Lockey, supra note 5, at 207.
31. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Although "favorable to an accused" may be understood as a broader category, for
the purposes of this paper, "exculpatory" and "favorable to an accused" are used interchangeably by the author
with the intent to connote the broader rubric. Cited sources, however, may still distinguish the terms.
32. Pursuant to Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 38 (1995), the prosecution is responsible for evidence
that was collected by or came into the possession of a member of the prosecutorial team, which generally
extends to the law enforcement agencies involved in the case.
33. Scholars also argue that specific sanctions against a prosecutor rarely accompany reversals based on
Brady error. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987); Barry Scheck, Professional and Conviction Integrity Programs: Why
We Need Them, Why They Will Work, and Models for Creating Them, 31 CARDOZO L. REv. 2215, 2219 (2010)
("It would be naive, if not irresponsible, to believe that the prospect of civil liability, disciplinary action, the
stigma of appellate reversal, or the initiation of criminal prosecution really serve as credible deterrents to Brady
violations.").
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the evidence in question.34 Brady concems often arise when such evidence lies in
the file of law enforcement team members on the case, but has not been transmit-
ted to the prosecutor. Prosecutorial lack of awareness of such evidence does not
exempt the prosecutor from disclosure obligations>' Fourth, evidence that relates
either to the determination of guilt or to that of sentencing must be disclosed.36
Fifth, although prosecutors should disclose all evidence favorable to the accused,
as a constitutional requirement under Brady, failure to disclose that could subject
the prosecutor to liability or serve as grounds for reversal involves only evidence
that qualifies as "material," meaning that "there is a reasonable probability that,
had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been
different."37 The U.S. Supreme Court has defined reasonable probability as one
that "'undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."' 38 The materiality
requirement enables courts, like the U.S. Supreme Court in the 2017 case of
Turner v. United States,39 to acknowledge that evidence is favorable to the
accused but that it is "too little, too weak, or too distant from the main evidentiary
points''4 to warrant disclosure. From a constitutional standpoint, without materi-
ality, the failure to disclose is not considered prejudicial to the defense.4 1 This
materiality requirement can provide a buffer to avoid post-trial findings of revers-
ible error. Because prosecutorial conduct is judged retrospectively using this
standard, it may also cause prosecutors to prospectively underweight the exculpa-
tory nature of the evidence based on an assessment that failure to disclose it
would not undermine confidence in the subsequent trial outcome. 2
Since Brady, the U.S. Supreme Court has clarified that the disclosure require-
ment applies not only to the prosecutor's case in chief, but also to impeachment
evidence. 3 The Court has also nullified the requirement that the defense make a
specific request for exculpatory evidence. Moreover, as noted above, the
34. Although prosecutors are liable for failure to disclose material exculpatory evidence in the possession of
the full law enforcement team on the case, unless the prosecution is at least aware of the items, disclosure,
absent perhaps an open-file approach, is unlikely.
35. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 38.
36. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
37. This is the materiality standard as articulated in the U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Turner v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017) (citations omitted). It found voice earlier in the decision in Kyles,
514 U.S. at 434.
38. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (citations omitted).
39. Turner v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1885 (2017).
40. Id. at 1894.
41. The Court has also clarified that, if error is found under the Brady line of cases, there is no need for a
subsequent harmless error review. Kyles, 514 U.S at 435 ("[O]nce a reviewing court applying Bagley [v.
United States, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)] has found constitutional error there is no need for further harmless-error
review." (citations omitted)). If the undisclosed evidence was material, then failure to disclose was prejudicial.
42. This is a prospective evaluation about a trial that has not yet taken place. The prospective application of
the retrospective materiality standard is one of the challenges of the Brady approach.
43. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
44. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433 34 ("Bagley held that regardless of request, favorable evidence is material, and
constitutional error results from its suppression by the government, 'if there is a reasonable probability that,
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prosecution is responsible for disclosing evidence favorable to the accused that is
known to those acting on behalf of the government in the case, including such
evidence in the possession of the law enforcement agencies with which the prose-
cution works.> The Court has, however, explicitly noted that the Constitution
does not require prosecutors to open their files generally to the defense.4 6 Subject
to a few exceptions, because defense counsel are not required to disclose their
theory of the case or witnesses to the prosecution, complying with Brady often
involves hypothesizing about what evidence might be favorable to the defense.
This can involve some mental gymnastics for a prosecutor imagining the defense
perspective on the case. As a result, the Court has cautioned prosecutors to err on
the side of disclosure.48
The frequency with which Brady error occurs is difficult to measure, but con-
cems that it is widespread populate discourse on the issue. Recent commentary in
the Ninth Circuit illustrates these concerns.4 9 In a 2013 dissent to a denial of a
petition for rehearing en banc, five Ninth Circuit judges signed onto a dissent that
lamented: "There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land."' To
support this, the judges cited no fewer than twenty-nine published cases involving
Brady error since 2000.1 This citation list does not, of course, include the many
cases that never reach the appellate level or the annals of case reporters, or more
generally where the Brady error goes undetected.
Brady functions as a constitutional floor below which a prosecutor may not
descend. It does not represent a ceiling. Thus, beyond Brady itself, state ethics
rules that are based on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct commonly
had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different."' (quot-
ingBagley, 473 U. S. at 682)).
45. Id. at 437 ("[T]he individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the
others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police.").
46. Id. ("We have never held that the Constitution demands an open file policy (however such a policy
might work out in practice)....").
47. For examples of such exceptions, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (upholding Florida's
notice of alibi rule requiring the defense to disclose information related to a prospective alibi defense to the
prosecution prior to trial); Izazaga v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 3d. 356 (1991) (upholding California discovery
statute requiring limited discovery disclosures to the prosecution by the defense as part of reciprocal discovery
law).
48. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1986) ("[T]he prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful
questions in favor of disclosure.").
49. See United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625 26, 630 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial
of petition for rehearing en banc).
50. Id. The judges went on to indicate that "[o]nly judges can put a stop to it." Id.
51. The dissent to the petition states that "Brady violations have reached epidemic proportions in recent
years, and the federal and state reporters bear testament to this unsettling trend." Id. at 631. For the list of the
twenty-nine cases cited by the dissent, see supra note 5. For a critique of the assertion that there is an epidemic
of Brady violations, including a notation that one of the twenty-nine cases was overturned on appeal, see
Coleman & Lockey, supra note 5.
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eliminate the materiality requirement.5 2 Instead, in often roughly comparable lan-
guage, they demand that " [t]he prosecutor in a criminal case shall... make timely
disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense ...."" For
the purposes of state bar ethics, these jurisdictions eliminate the materiality
requirement. Even without a materiality buffer, prosecutors still generally need to
be aware of the existence of the evidence and comprehend its favorable nature to
the defense in order to recognize that it must be disclosed under the rule, although
the elimination of the materiality buffer should have a positive effect on encour-
aging disclosure of evidence that prosecutors under Brady would have recognized
as favorable to the accused but not material.
II. UNDERSTANDING BRADY ERROR
There is limited empirical data specifically pinpointing the causes of Brady
error.5 4 From what data exists, as augmented by experience, educated surmises,
52. See, e.g., FLA. BAR RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-3.8 (c) (2018). The relevant Florida Rule of
Professional Conduct provides in part:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall... (c) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence
or information known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates
the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unpri-
vileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of
this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.
FLA. BAR RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-3.8 (c) (2018).
The comparable section of the California rule, whose effective date is November 1, 2018, explicitly enumer-
ates the mental state involved as knows or reasonably should know. It reads:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall: ... (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evi-
dence or information known to the prosecutor that the prosecutor knows or reasonably should
know tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense, or mitigate the sentence, except
when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal[.]
CAL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (asterisks omitted), http://www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/
rules/Rule 3.8-Exec Summary-Redline.pdf [https://perma.cc/DH3R-YTS6]; see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2018) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
53. FLA. BAR RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-3.8 (c) (2018); MODEL RULES R. 3.8. Section (d) of the ABA
ModelRules Rule 3.8 also requires disclosure with respect to sentencing as follows: "The prosecutor in a crimi-
nal case shall.., in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged miti-
gating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a
protective order of the tribunal[.]" MODEL RULES R. 3.8.
54. Scheck, supra note 33, at 2216 ("Recognizing there is little empirical data on the causes of Brady viola-
tions .... ); Faigman et al., supra note 11, at 1141 ("[W]e have no studies, as of yet, that look at prosecutors'
and defense attorneys' implicit biases and attempt to correlate them with those individuals' charging practices
or plea bargains. Nor do we know as much as we would like about their implicit biases more generally.");
Yaroshefsky, supra note 7 ("It is difficult to conduct studies of prosecutors' decision making, and any conclu-
sions necessarily reflect the inherent bias of results based upon self-reporting."). Some empirical and/or statisti-
cal research about Brady prosecutorial tasks and decision making does exist; a subset of which relates
specifically to cognitive bias. See, e.g., JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS
SO MUCH ERROR IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 411 12 (2002), http://www2.law.
columbia.edu/brokensystem2 [https://perma.cc/TL93-7Y9B]; Barbara O'Brien, A Recipe for Bias: An
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and research in cognitive psychology, 5 scholars and jurists posit a number of
likely explanations. Professor Barry Scheck, a founder of the Innocence Project,
proposes three overarching categories through which more specific explanations
can be explored.' This Article uses a variation of those three categories as fol-
lows: 1) the prosecutor was not aware the evidence existed, but law enforcement
was aware of the evidence; 2) the prosecutor was aware the evidence existed but
did not recognize its favorable material nature; and 3) the prosecutor was aware
the evidence existed and recognized or at least "strongly suspected"5 7 its Brady
nature but intentionally withheld it. 8
Empirical Look at the Interplay Between Institutional Incentives and Bounded Rationality in Prosecutorial
Decision Making, 74 Mo. L. REv. 999 (2009); Yaroshefsky, supra note 7.
55. See infra notes 60-114 and accompanying text.
56. Scheck, supra note 33, at 2216. In a "thought experiment" on the subject, Professor Scheck captures
three of these salient and overarching explanations as follows:
(1) The Brady material was not in the prosecutor's file because the police did not provide it in
written form to the prosecutor working on the case;
(2) The Brady material was in the prosecution's file, or known to the prosecutor from an oral
communication, but the prosecution did not identify it as Brady and, therefore, did not turn it
over to the defense; and
(3) The prosecutor did not turn over to the defense information that he or she knew or strongly
suspected could be Brady material out of fear.
Id. at 2227.
57. Id.
58. Id. Applying the framework in the text above to the underlying facts in Connick v. Thompson, 563
U.S. 51 (2011), merits consideration of three types of evidence that prosecutors did not disclose. The first
was the laboratory report on blood taken from a swatch of material "stained by the robber's blood" in the
robbery prosecution as well as the swatch itself. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 84 (2011)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The report indicated that the blood type involved was type B. Id. at 81
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). According to the Supreme Court opinion, the prosecution did not know Mr.
Thompson's blood type, which, in fact, was type 0. Id. at 55 56. "His prosecutors failed to disclose the
existence of the swatch or the test results." Id. at 81 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting). Nor, according to Justice
Ginsburg's dissent, did the defense have a reasonable opportunity to access the swatch for inspection or
testing before trial. Id. at 83 85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Then, prosecutor "Deegan checked the swatch
out of the property room on the morning of the first day of trial, but the prosecution did not produce the
swatch at trial.... Deegan did not return the swatch to the property room after trial, and the swatch has
never been found." Id. at 85. Nine years after Mr. Thompson's convictions for robbery and murder,
Deegan, then terminally ill, confessed to a friend and former prosecutor from that same office "'that he
[Deegan] had intentionally suppressed blood evidence in the armed robbery trial of John Thompson."'
Id. at 87 88 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Record EX583). (It was to prosecutor Deegan's confession
that the first paragraph of this Article refers.) Because the prosecution did not actually know that
Thompson's blood type did not match the one on the swatch, some may argue that the lab report and
swatch fall into category two, meaning the prosecution knew of the evidence but did not recognize its ex-
culpatory nature. Deegan's confession, however, may suggest that there was an awareness of the need to
disclose the report as potential Brady material, which would place the Thompson case in category three
with respect to the lab report and swatch. If readers view the laboratory report on the blood type of the
swatch as equivocal in terms of category placement, other evidence withheld by the prosecution was
arguably less equivocal. Prosecutors also failed to disclose police reports documenting an eyewitness'
initial description of the perpetrator, a description that can be understood as substantially inconsistent
with Mr. Thompson's appearance at the time. Id. at 85 87. In addition, the prosecutor failed to disclose
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A. CATEGORY ONE: PROSECUTORIAL LACK OF AWARENESS OF EVIDENCE
IN THE POSSESSION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
59
A myriad of specific potential explanations appears within each of these three
categories. For example, the press of high caseloads for police can result in evi-
dence, both exculpatory and inculpatory, not being documented or sent to the pros-
ecutor's office at all. This produces category one error, where law enforcement
is aware of the existence of the evidence, but the prosecutor is not. Similarly,
"[p]rosecutors could literally miss the evidence, such as a police or laboratory
report buried among many documents, due to crushing caseloads and not having
enough time to review their file as carefully as they would like."6 A series of inter-
views with thirty-five current and former prosecutors in seven offices conducted in
2010 by Professor Ellen Yaroshefsky and her team revealed the press of work as
one important reason prosecutors fail to disclose.61 She explained that "[h]igh
caseloads and under-funding, notably in large urban jurisdictions, create an envi-
ronment with insufficient documentation of witness statements, failure to follow
up on police evidence, and lack of attention to items of evidentiary value.
6 2
Remedies for addressing errors caused by underfunding and inadequate resour-
ces can focus, at least in part, directly on injections of appropriate resources at
critical junctures in the Brady evaluation process. Scholars' recommendations for
these and other structural bases for Brady error include processes to more easily
document witness statements, protocols for circling back to police regarding evi-
dence in their possession, supplemental reviews by the line prosecutor or supervi-
sors of evidence in cases, and monitoring and cross-checking systems to review
the success of evidence evaluation.63
audiotapes intimating that a key witness was expecting to receive the $15,000 reward that the family of the vic-
tim had offered. Id. Instead, that witness:
testified that he volunteered information to the police with no knowledge of reward money....
Because prosecutors had not produced the audiotapes of [that witness'] conversations with the
[victim's] family (or a police summary of the tapes), Thompson's attorneys could do little to cast
doubt on [that witness'] credibility. In closing argument, the prosecution emphasized that
Thompson presented no "direct evidence" that reward money had motivated any of the witnesses.
Id. at 86. With respect to the latter two types of evidence, the eyewitness description and the potential reward,
as described in Justice Ginsburg's dissent, presumably they should place the Thompson case within category
three.
59. For purposes of this analysis, the law enforcement awareness could either be awareness of the existence
of the evidence or it could encompass both awareness of the existence and awareness of the likely Brady nature
of the evidence.
60. Scheck, supra note 33, at 2233. Under Professor Scheck's definitions, which differ somewhat from those
in this Article, being unaware of evidence that is contained in a prosecution file would fall under category two.
Because of the modified definition of category one in this Article, here, it would fall under category one.
61. Yaroshefsky, supra note 7.
62. Id. These explanations also may result from cognitive bias, which is the heading that Professor
Yaroshefsky employs for them in her scholarship. Id. But some of them might be effectively addressed, at least
in part, by additional resources.
63. See, e.g., Burke, Neutralizing, supra note 7, at 520 29; Scheck, supra note 33, at 2238 56.
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B. CATEGORY TWO: PROSECUTORIAL AWARENESS OF EVIDENCE BUT
FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE BRADY NATURE
In the second category, the prosecutor is aware of the evidence but fails to
appreciate its material favorable nature. Here, a prosecutor could misunderstand
the Brady standard itself. With respect to the causes of Brady error, an extensive
empirical and statistical analysis on factors contributing to various types of error
in capital cases suggests that "[o]ne reason official suppression of important evi-
dence is common before trial ... is that the legal rule stating when police and
prosecutors must turn over evidence is ambiguous and difficult to apply."64 The
authors of this investigation of errors in capital cases explain that their
analyses reveal that it is in close cases-those in which a small amount of evi-
dence might tip the outcome in a different direction-that the risk of serious
error is the greatest. And yet under existing rules, it is in just those cases that
officials are especially likely to conclude that disclosure of the seemingly
small amounts of exculpatory evidence in their files is not required because the
officials do not believe (as existing rules require before disclosure is manda-
tory) that the evidence would probably change the outcome of trial.65
Similarly, due to a misunderstanding about the scope of the Brady rule, a pros-
ecutor might believe, for example, that Brady did not apply to the type of evi-
dence involved, e.g., video of an exam in an alleged sexual abuse case taken by
hospital personnel of an in-hospital procedure conducted by medical personnel
and not turned over to law enforcement.66 Suggested remedies for these types of
category two failures include, for example, training focused on the scope of evi-
dence to which Brady applies and changes to prosecutorial office culture that en-
courage disclosure, as well as clarification or modification of Brady itself.67
C. PROSECUTORIAL AWARENESS OF EVIDENCE AND RECOGNITION OF
BRADY NATURE
Explanations in the third category, where the prosecutor is aware of the evi-
dence and recognizes its Brady qualities but declines to disclose, might include,
for example, "fear that losing a case would prevent professional advancement or
64. Liebman et al., supra note 54, at 411.
65. Id. at 411 12 (footnotes omitted). Compare id. at 411 12 ("would probably"), with Turner v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 1885, 1893 (2017) ("'reasonable probability.., the result of the proceeding would have been
different"' (citation omitted)).
66. People v. Uribe, 162 Cal. App. 4th 1457, 1463 (2008). This case involves Brady failure to disclose a
"videotape of a medical examination of [the victim] an examination commonly (and hereafter) referred to as
a SART (Sexual Assault Response Team) exam." Id. at 1463. The trial court had ruled that .'[medical or psy-
chiatric evidence in the possession of a county hospital or clinic [is] not in the possession of the 'prosecution
team' for purposes of the Brady rule[,]' but the appellate court ruled that SART was part of the prosecution
team. Id. at 1471, 1482.
67. See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 7, at 355.
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result in demotion"6 8 and "[fWear that the defense lawyer or defendant may use
Brady material to tailor testimony or suborn perjury[.] '6 9 In addition, prosecutors
have safety concerns for witnesses because of disclosure obligations.7 0 For
instance, with respect specifically to the timing of disclosure, rather than whether
disclosure would take place, Professor Yaroshefsky quotes a prosecutor from her
survey as saying: "'Did he do it or not? If he did, why should I help the defense
win its case by turning over information to discredit my witness before I have to?
Lives of victims can hang in the balance."'7 1 Concerns like the three raised here
might drive a prosecutor, who is aware of the evidence and its favorable nature,
to delay disclosure or withhold that evidence entirely.
If preferencing professional advancement over required disclosure represents a
rational cost benefit analysis, albeit a highly problematic one, scholars have pro-
posed or analyzed a variety of approaches to encourage disclosure that might
address that preference. These include naming prosecutors in appellate reversals
for Brady error, 2 charging prosecutors with felony conduct, 3 and changing
office culture to uncouple promotions from prevailing at trial.7 4 With respect to
the concern about possible manipulation by recipients of the information, avail-
able responses may include recognizing that, while perhaps unlikely, potential
manipulation is a risk inherent in the disclosure requirement, as well as strength-
ening enforcement mechanisms for the ethical rules related to coaching witnesses
and suborning perjury.
With respect to risks to witnesses through disclosure, Professor Gerald
Reamey opines that "the fear of witness intimidation or worse is not borne out by
the experience in other countries."" The experience elsewhere is an important
68. Scheck, supra note 33, at 2237.
69. Id. at 2236.
70. Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 54 55 (2015).
71. Yaroshefsky, supra note 7.
72. See Adam Gerschowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1059 (2009).
73. Jodi Nafzger, Leveling Felony Charges at Prosecutors for Withholding Evidence, 66 DRAKE L. REv.
307, 335 (2018) (describing CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE § 141, which provides in part: "(c) A prosecuting attor-
ney who intentionally and in bad faith alters, modifies, or withholds any physical matter, digital image, video
recording, or relevant exculpatory material or information, knowing that it is relevant and material to the out-
come of the case, with the specific intent that the physical matter, digital image, video recording, or relevant ex-
culpatory material or information will be concealed or destroyed, or fraudulently represented as the original
evidence upon a trial, proceeding, or inquiry, is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment pursuant to sub-
division (h) of Section 1170 for 16 months, or two or three years"); Christina E. Urhausen, California's New
Law Will Fail to Address the Larger Problem of Brady Violations, 69 HASTINGS L.J. 1673 (2018).
74. Scheck, supra note 33, at 2237 ("[T]he chief prosecutor (especially an elected prosecutor) [should] es-
tablish an environment where winning trials is not the most important measure of success."). Other solutions
that scholarship suggests include taking the decision about disclosure away from the prosecutor and entrusting
it to a judge. Daniel J. Capra, Access to Exculpatory Evidence: Avoiding the Agurs Problems of Prosecutorial
Discretion and Retrospective Review, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 391, 427 (1984). For further discussion of this
approach, see infra text accompanying note 136.
75. Gerald S. Reamey, The Truth Might Set You Free: How the Michael Morton Act Could Fundamentally
Change Texas Criminal Discovery, or Not, 48 TEX. TECH L. REv. 893, 896 ("In most advanced legal systems,
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factor to consider, but, given other differences in cultural and criminal justice sys-
tems, perhaps not a complete response. To the extent that concerns specifically
about safety drive withholding Brady material, better protective mechanisms for
release of the information and securing protective orders might help address those
concerns and still allow for appropriate disclosure.76 At a minimum, further study
of jurisdictions in the U.S. with open-file approaches to discovery in criminal
cases might expand the data on whether more (and earlier) disclosure puts wit-
nesses at greater risk.77 Scholars' recommended remedies for addressing these
category three concerns merit serious consideration as they address important
potential causes of Brady error.
D. ALL THREE CATEGORIES: COGNITIVE BIAS DRIVEN EXPLANATIONS
The explanations above for prosecutorial failure to disclose admit to a variety
of causes, including high caseloads, ineffective communication between police
and prosecutors, legal ambiguity, as well as potential cognitive bias. To better
understand the role that cognitive bias specifically can play, this section focuses
on a range of explanations where cognitive bias may serve as a contributing or
the determinative factor in Brady error. Such explanations may appear in each of
the three categories.
the defense receives often early in the process and without requesting it all of the evidence collected by the
police and prosecution .... While judges should be able to order suitable, tailored protections for witnesses and
evidence in individual cases, a rule that blocks disclosure exacts a high cost from all defendants, especially in
the absence of a legitimate cause for concern." (footnotes omitted) (citing Eugene Cermti, Through the
Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine. Some New Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process,
94 Ky. L.J. 211, 214 15,253 55 (2005))).
76. See, e.g., Reamey, supra note 75, at 896. For an analysis of concerns about witness safety, see also Jenia
Joncheva Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases. An Empirical
Comparison, 73 WASH & LEE L. REV. 285,310-11 (2016). Turner & Redlich note that:
[O]pponents of open-file discovery see such provisions as insufficiently protective of witness inter-
ests. As one opponent noted, they "require prosecutors and judges to gamble with witness safety
by attempting to predict the unpredictable." [(citing Sara N. Pole, Dep't of State Police, Minority
Comments, SUPREME COURT OF VA., REP. OF THE SPEC. COMM. ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY RULES
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE & JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VA. 55 (Dec. 2,2014))]. Opponents
further note that applications for protective orders depend on prosecutors recognizing that certain
information in their files might endanger a witness. But overworked and harried prosecutors may
not have the time or energy to review the evidence carefully before disclosing it and may miss
signs of potential threats to witnesses. Some critics of open-file have also argued that protective
orders would be insufficient to ensure witness safety because:
[T]rial courts are not comfortable with ambiguous proof of threats. They balk at addressing the
kinds of threats more commonly seen, such as property mysteriously destroyed, defendants'
friends simply driving by a witness's home several times, calls from blocked or unknown numbers,
and statements to witnesses using just the right kind of tone or inflection."
Id. at 310 11 (footnotes omitted) (quoting C. David Sands III, Deputy Commonwealth's Attorney, Cty. of
Orange, Va., Comment Letter on Proposed Virginia Criminal Discovery Rules (June 30,2015)).
77. Scholars have undertaken some research to evaluate and compare various dimensions of open-file juris-
dictions. See, e.g., Turner & Redlich, supra note 76; Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File
Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771,777 (2017); infra notes 140 162 and accompanying text.
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Prosecutors are responsible for evaluating evidence and affirmatively deciding
whether to formally accuse an individual of committing a crime.78 If a prosecutor
holds fast to the prescribed professional standards, that individual is only charg-
ing cases "she believes adequately encompass the accused's criminal activity and
which ... she reasonably believes can be substantiated by admissible evidence at
trial."7 9 At a minimum, ethical rules generally require that a "prosecutor in a
criminal case shall ... refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor
knows is not supported by probable cause."80
Although subject to some debate, issuing charges can be understood as a for-
mal statement that the prosecutor believes the evidence meets those standards
and that the accused is guilty of the crime.81 At least from this time forward, a
perception that the accused is guilty, what this Article will refer to as a "Guilt
Perspective, ' '1 2 may root itself in the prosecutor's mind and thereafter serve as the
filter through which evidence is understood.83 This Guilt Perspective renders the
prosecutor susceptible to a variety of cognitive biases.
Scholars have posited the correlation of several types of cognitive bias as par-
ticularly relevant to the question of Brady error and the Guilt Perspective filter.84
Professor Alafair Burke, for example, enumerates four of these: "confirmation
bias, selective information processing, belief perseverance, and the avoidance of
cognitive dissonance. '"85
For a prosecutor, once the Guilt Perspective takes hold, Professor Burke argues
that "confirmation bias causes her to seek information that confirms the theory of
guilt; selective information processing causes her to trust information tending to
confirm the theory of guilt and distrust potentially exculpatory evidence; and
78. NAT'L PROSECUTION STANDARDS 4-2.1 (NAT'L DIST. ATTORNEYS' ASS'N 3d ed.) ("It is the ultimate
responsibility of the prosecutor's office to determine which criminal charges should be prosecuted and against
whom.").
79. Id. at 4-2.2.
80. MODEL RULES. R. 3.8 (a).
81. The debate relates to whether, by charging someone with a crime, the prosecutor is conveying that the
prosecutor personally believes the accused is culpable. For a discussion of views on this issue, see, e.g., Burke,
Improving, supra note 7, at nn. 107-08 and accompanying text.
82. See Herbert Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11 13 (1964) ("The pre-
sumption of guilt allows the Crime Control Model to deal efficiently with large numbers. The supposition is
that the screening processes operated by police and prosecutors are reliable indicators of probable guilt. Once a
man has been investigated without being found to be probably innocent, or, to put it differently, once a determi-
nation has been made that there is enough evidence of guilt so that he should be held for further action rather
than released from the process, then all subsequent activity directed toward him is based on the view that he is
probably guilty. The precise point at which this occurs will vary from case to case ... The presumption of
guilt... is basically a prediction of outcome.").
83. See, e.g., Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at 1614 ("In the context of prosecutorial decision making, the
biasing theory is the prosecutor's belief that the defendant is guilty."). Commentators often refer to the tend-
ency to hold fast to a presumption of guilt as the presumption being "sticky" or resulting in "tunnel vision." Id.
at 1604-07; Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 140 (2004).
84. See, e.g., Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at 1593 94 (footnotes omitted).
85. Id. at 1593 94 (footnotes omitted).
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belief perseverance causes her to adhere to the theory of guilt even when the evi-
dence initially supporting that theory is undermined."86 Then, efforts to quell cog-
nitive dissonance can further discourage the prosecutor from questioning the
Guilt Perspective. As Professor Barbara O'Brien explains, "Substantial psycho-
logical research demonstrates that what people want to see influences what they
do see."88
Because prosecutors themselves and prosecutorial tasks have not been the sub-
jects of extensive cognitive bias research, scholars take a leap, albeit a logical and
intuitive one, in applying the general results on cognitive bias to prosecutorial de-
cision making.89 Nonetheless, there exists some empirical work specifically on
prosecutorial tasks and cognitive bias. Professor O'Brien, for instance, has con-
ducted empirical work with lay participants in the context of evaluating a mock
criminal case and the cognitive bias known as defensive bolstering. She describes
such bolstering as occurring "when people must justify a decision to which they
have already committed."90 Professor O'Brien studied how the criteria used to
judge the evaluators of a criminal case affects the tendency for those evaluators
to look for and find support for their initial impressions. She reports that "[t]he
studies ... show that expecting to be judged for how well one persuades others
that a suspect is guilty could aggravate the tendency to confirm initial suspi-
cions."91 Because a primary role for prosecutors involves persuading the trier of
fact of an accused's guilt, the cognitive bias of defensive bolstering may influence
and detract from a prosecutor's ability to see evidence as exculpatory.
Equipped with definitions of several specific types of cognitive bias, let us
return to explanations for Brady error and examine examples in each of the three
categories for which cognitive bias could be a significant, if not the determina-
tive, factor.
86. Id. at 1614 (footnote omitted). For a more detailed discussion of confirmation bias and selective infor-
mation processing, see, e.g., Alafair Burke, Commentary: Brady's Brainteaser: The Accidental Prosecutor and
Cognitive Bias, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 575, 577 80 (2007) [hereinafter Burke, Brainteaser].
87. O'Brien, supra note 54, at 1011, 1014 15. According to Leon Festinger, cognitive dissonance "centers
around the idea that if a person knows various things that are not psychologically consistent with one another,
he will, in a variety of ways, try to make them more consistent." Leon Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, 207
So. AM. 93, 93 (1962). Avoiding cognitive dissonance for a prosecutor who believes the defendant is guilty
might involve, for example, unconsciously reducing the credibility the prosecutor accords to a witness whose
account seems exculpatory.
88. O'Brien, supra note 54, at 1011 (citing Nickerson, supra note 13).
89. See Aviram, supra note 7, at 45 ("While this Article draws on rich experimental literature regarding con-
firmation bias and cultural cognition of prosecutors, the specific impact of these phenomena on prosecutorial
fact perception, while plausible, has not been experimentally tested yet.").
90. O'Brien, supra note 54, at 1004. Defensive bolstering is not related to criminal defense. It is part of the
lexicon of cognitive science research.
91. Id. at 1036.
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1. COGNITIVE BIAS AND CATEGORY ONE ERROR
In category one error, the prosecutor is not aware of the potentially exculpatory
evidence. In contrast, investigating officers are aware of the existence of the evi-
dence, although they may or may not classify it as favorable to the accused.
Consequently, exploring possible cognitive bias in the category one context
focuses initially on its potential effect in the investigation phase of the case.
Police officers often receive a great deal of information when conducting an
investigation in a criminal case. The officers then distill that evidence into a
police report. By the time an officer is writing a report (and perhaps has a suspect
in custody), much like by the time a prosecutor issues charges, a presumption of
guilt about the charges the police officer will recommend that the prosecutor issue
may already have taken hold in the officer's mind. Information received subse-
quent to that arrest may then trigger cognitive biases. As a result, confirmation
bias may incline the officer to fail to perceive or appreciate evidence of an equiv-
ocal or debatable Brady nature as exculpatory. The force of selective information
processing might encourage officers to trust the original evidence that led to a
belief in a suspect's guilt with respect to the proposed charges and to distrust
potentially exculpatory information. Then, belief perseverance can encourage the
officer to hold fast to the presumption of guilt even in the face of potentially ex-
culpatory evidence. Similarly, in an effort to quell cognitive dissonance, the offi-
cer may discount evidence, which, to a neutral observer, is obvious Brady
material, as necessary to transmit to the prosecutor.
92
A growing body of empirical research examines the effect of cognitive biases
on police investigation practices. 93 It suggests that such biases can distort
92. Scheck, supra note 33, at 2229 ("[P]olice do not reduce oral statements to writing that turn out to be
Brady material, or eventually lead to Brady material, because the police do not believe that such oral statements
were in any way exculpatory.").
93. See, e.g., Karl Ask, Anna Rebelius & Pdr Anders Granhag, The "Elasticity" of Criminal Evidence: A
Moderator ofInvestigator Bias, 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1245, 1253 (2008) ("[T]he same piece of evi-
dence (e.g. a witness' identification decision) was considered less reliable when it challenged the suspicions
against a known suspect than when it confirmed the suspicions."); Karl Ask & PAr Anders Granhag,
Motivational Bias in Criminal Investigators' Judgments of Witness Reliability, J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL., 37,
561 91 (2007) (finding support for asymmetrical skepticism in criminal investigators' evaluation of evidence
supporting or conflicting with a pre-existing hypothesis of guilt) [hereinafter Ask & Granhag, Judgments of
Witness Reliability]; Karl Ask & Pr Anders Granhag, Motivational Sources of Confirmation Bias in Criminal
Investigations: The Need for Cognitive Closure, 2 J. INVESTIGATIVE PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 43, 57
58 (2005) (while noting limitations on the support that the experiments provided for the experiment's hypothe-
ses, researchers indicated that "the results of the present study provided some support for the hypothesis that
people are influenced by their initial hypotheses regarding a crime when processing subsequent crime-related
information"); Karl Ask, Marc-Andr6 Reinhard, Tamara Marksteiner & Pdr Anders Granhag, Elasticity in
Evaluations of Criminal Evidence: Exploring the Role of Cognitive Dissonance, 16 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL
PSYCHOL. 289, 301 (2011) ("[O]ur two experiments show that the experience of dissonance is related to evalua-
tions of criminal evidence. However, the motivational mechanism involved appears to be more complex than
expected."); Steve D. Charman, Melissa Kavetski & Dana Him Mueller, Cognitive Bias in the Legal System:
Police Officers Evaluate Ambiguous Evidence in a Belief-Consistent Manner, 6 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY &
COGNITION 193, 198 (2017) (reporting that "[p]olice officers' evaluations of evidence were related to their
20 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 32:1
information processing to the detriment of suspects and fairness in an investiga-
tion. 94 For example, in a study involving law enforcement investigators as partici-
pants, researchers tested whether the investigators would give differential
credence to a witness whose statement supported a pre-existing hypothesis of
guilt over that given to a witness whose statement conflicted with such a hypothe-
sis. In the parlance of the study, the researchers focused on "asymmetrical skepti-
cism, which is the tendency to subject evidence that runs counter to a person's
prior belief regarding an issue to more critical examination than belief-consistent
evidence."9 As described in the study's case vignette, the only distinction in the
two scenarios of the witness' account involved whether the witness heard two
women arguing, a statement that supported the pre-existing inference that the per-
petrator of the homicide was a female, or whether the witness heard a man and a
woman arguing, a statement that conflicted with the pre-existing inference of a
female perpetrator.96 The researchers report that "[t]he results clearly support the
asymmetrical skepticism hypothesis. Investigators rated the belief-inconsistent
(i.e., exonerating) witness as less reliable and credible, and judged [that individu-
al's] witnessing and recall conditions to be less favorable, compared with the
belief-consistent (i.e., incriminating) witness."" Such biases may work to prevent
or discourage an officer from giving appropriate credence to exculpatory material
and thus making a prosecutor aware of the existence of the evidence, which pro-
duces category one failures.98
Translated into the day-to-day reality of police work, imagine that a witness
reports a residential burglary. Later that evening, the officer apprehends a person
initial beliefs in a suspect's guilt: The more likely they were to believe the suspect was guilty, the more incrimi-
nating they perceived subsequent ambiguous evidence to be").
94. See, e.g., Karl Ask, Anna Rebelius & Par Anders Granhag, The "Elasticity" of Criminal Evidence. A
Moderator of Investigator Bias, 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1245, 1253 (2008); Ask & Granhag,
Judgments of Witness Reliability, supra note 93, at 561 91; Karl Ask & Pr Anders Granhag, Motivational
Sources of Confirmation Bias in Criminal Investigations. The Need for Cognitive Closure, 2 J. INVESTIGATIVE
PSYCHOL. & OFFENDER PROFILING 43, 57 58 (2005); Karl Ask, Marc-Andr6 Reinhard, Tamara Marksteiner &
Pr Anders Granhag, Elasticity in Evaluations of Criminal Evidence. Exploring the Role of Cognitive
Dissonance, 16 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 289, 301 (2011); Steve D. Charman, Melissa Kavetski &
Dana Him Mueller, Cognitive Bias in the Legal System. Police Officers Evaluate Ambiguous Evidence in a
Belief-Consistent Manner, 6 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 193, 198 (2017).
95. Ask & Granhag, Judgments of Witness Reliability, supra note 93, at 579.
96. Id. at 567468.
97. Id. at 579. In subsequent research, scholars focused on trying to ascertain the cause of the asymmet-
rical skepticism. Tamara Marksteiner, Karl Ask, Marc-Andr6 Reinhard & Par Anders Granhag,
Asymmetrical Scepticism Towards Criminal Evidence. The Role of Goal- and Belief-Consistency, 25
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 541, 545 (2011) ("[F]inding cannot be taken as unequivocal support for ei-
ther the belief-consistency or the goal-consistency account, but the fact that the reliability ratings were not
reversed when participants were equipped with an 'innocent' (as opposed to 'guilty') hypothesis does
show that the asymmetrical-scepticism effect cannot be accounted for entirely in terms of belief-
consistency.").
98. To address these biases, a similar virtual reality approach to the one proposed for prosecutors in Part V
could be considered for law enforcement training. That would, of course, require an analysis of the potential
impact on police work more generally, among other factors.
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generally fitting an eyewitness' description of the burglar near the scene of the
crime in possession of property stolen from the residence. In the press of the
investigation and arrest, the officer discounts, does not record, and subsequently
forgets about a dispatch several hours later regarding a remarkably similar bur-
glary just a block from the originally reported burglary. The officer shifts patrol
beats, and the information about the subsequent burglary is never transmitted to
the prosecutor.99 Although cognitive bias is not the only available factor to
explain the failure to transmit the likely Brady information to the prosecutor here,
cognitive bias offers one powerful and plausible explanation for category one
failures.
Supplementing the cognitive bias that may afflict the evidence-gathering offi-
cer, a prosecutor may decline to request materials that the police have collected
subsequent to the issuance of charges.1"' Cognitive bias may play a role in this
choice not to follow up with police investigators. In addition, or instead, even if
there is follow-up, bias may affect the follow-up questions that a prosecutor does
or does not ask. If you are already convinced that the defendant is guilty, that state
of mind may result in generating fewer questions that encourage investigation of
potential innocence. "For example, imagine results of laboratory tests from a
crime lab. A prosecutor might not think to ask for the lab's corrective-action logs
or the analyst's proficiency-test results," '' 0 even though both could generate im-
portant Brady material. Operating under a Guilt Perspective and perceiving there
to be adequate evidence to meet the burden at trial, a prosecutor may decide to
avoid potential cognitive dissonance by leaving the state of the evidence undis-
turbed. With a choice not to contact the police or the failure to ask certain follow-
up questions, the prosecutor's existing perceptions also remain undisturbed, and
the prosecutor may lack awareness of evidence favorable to the accused that
answers to those questions might have generated.
2. COGNITIVE BIAS AND CATEGORY Two ERROR
In the second category, where a prosecutor is aware of the existence of evi-
dence but does not recognize its favorable nature to the defense or perhaps its
materiality, the risk of cognitive bias distorting the evaluation process may be the
most pronounced. Imagine a case involving a series of thefts committed by a
99. Or, imagine the case where police officers are familiar with an essential eyewitness from prior contacts,
although ones that did not generate police reports, regarding alcohol ingestion. In the case under investigation,
the officers are focused on the eyewitness' contribution to identifying the individual whom the officers believe
was responsible for a serious crime. They assume the witness is sober and do not perform any sobriety tests.
They also neglect to mention in their reports any of their prior contacts with this individual, someone whom
they might characterize as a sober alcoholic. For a discussion of the analogous issue, but with respect to a prose-
cutor's evaluation of whether to disclose and the potential impact of cognitive bias on that evaluation, see
Burke, Brainteaser, supra note 86, at 578 80.
100. Scheck, supra note 33, at 2228 29.
101. Carrie Leonetti, Feedback on March 16t ' Manuscript (on file with author). This example was kindly
supplied by Carrie Leonetti in her thoughtful and thorough review of an earlier version of the manuscript.
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number of co-conspirators in which it turns out that the defendant was actually in
custody on several of the days on which those thefts occurred. From a defense
perspective, the defendant's custody status may be the most powerful evidence of
the defendant's innocence. But from a prosecutorial perspective, because the case
is charged as a conspiracy, and there is substantial evidence that the defendant is
a member of the conspiracy and personally committed some of the thefts, the fact
that the defendant was in custody during several of the thefts may be powerful
evidence of the conspiracy itself, i.e., that several people planned and imple-
mented the series of thefts. In evaluating whether the defendant's custody record
should be disclosed, a prosecutor's Guilt Perspective may activate a full cascade
of cognitive biases.10
2
Consider, for example, the potential effect of defensive bolstering, the cogni-
tive bias at issue in the empirical work by Professor O'Brien discussed above.0 3
She reports that, in her first study, for participants assigned a role that prosecutors
play, being judged for their ability to persuade others of their conclusions, partici-
pants "interpreted ambiguous or inconsistent evidence in a way that was more
consistent with the initial suspect's guilt."' 4 Applied to the evidence above of the
defendant's in-custody status during several of the thefts, one could readily imag-
ine defensive bolstering influencing a prosecutor's evaluation of that evidence
such that the prosecutor perceives it as consistent with guilt of the conspiracy
charge, rather than as material exculpatory evidence requiring disclosure.
Defensive bolstering is but one of a number of cognitive biases that could be at
work in each instance of prosecutorial evaluation of evidence, particularly once
the Guilt Perspective has taken hold, thus decreasing the likelihood that the prose-
cutor will perceive or appreciate the evidence as material and exculpatory.05
Prosecutorial evaluations of evidence under a Brady standard anticipate that a
prosecutor will be able to effectively imagine the case from a defense perspec-
tive. 16 The presence, however, of a Guilt Perspective renders this exercise in
imagining a contrasting or opposite view of the case especially challenging.
3. COGNITIVE BIAS AND CATEGORY THREE ERROR
With respect to category three error, a prosecutor might realize that the evi-
dence in question would be material and favorable to the defense, but, for exam-
ple, believe so strongly in a defendant's guilt that the prosecutor deliberately
102. For a discussion of how implicit racial bias might impact a prosecutor's decision in the context of
Brady, see Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias on the Exercise of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 36 SEATTLE L. REv. 795, 815 16 (2012).
103. See O'Brien, supra note 54.
104. O'Brien, supra note 54, at 1029.
105. For an analysis of how confirmation bias and selective information processing might affect a prosecu-
tor's decision to disclose the fact that an eyewitness to a robbery is a chronic alcoholic, see Burke, Brainteaser,
supra note 86, at 578 80.
106. See, e.g., Burke, Brainteaser, supra note 86.
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declines to disclose the Brady evidence. Imagine this arises because the prosecu-
tor does not trust that a jury will evaluate the evidence in the same way that the
prosecutor does and will give that exculpatory evidence more weight than the
prosecutor believes it deserves.10 7 The prosecutor's steadfast belief in the defend-
ant's guilt may stem, for example, from awareness of other evidence that is highly
incriminatory but inadmissible, or it may stem, inter alia, from cognitive biases
that prevent the prosecutor from fully appreciating the genuinely exculpatory
weight of that evidence.0 8
In recent years, hundreds of individuals convicted of serious crimes have been
exonerated based on compelling forensic evidence of innocence.10 9 In a number
of those cases, even after courts had reversed the convictions, and forensic evi-
dence supported the accused's factual innocence, prosecutors resisted acknowl-
edging the impact of that evidence.1 In considering why a prosecutor would
fight dismissal even when the evidence speaks so clearly of innocence, scholars
have invoked the effects of cognitive bias. 1 One can readily imagine the horror,
the guilt, and the cognitive dissonance that a conscientious prosecutor might feel
in realizing that the prosecutor has personally caused an innocent person to be
incarcerated for years for a crime the person did not commit. Insisting that the
system is mistaken in its view of innocence may alleviate some of what might
be traumatic cognitive dissonance for that prosecutor. As Professor Alafair Burke
explains more generally: "From this perspective, prosecutorial resistance to
defense claims of innocence can be viewed as deep (and inherently human)
adherences to the 'sticky' presumptions of guilt that result from various forms of
cognitive bias that can impede the neutrality of prosecutors throughout their han-
dling of a case."' 1
2
107. Other explanations may also be at play. Or, if cognitive bias does not really play a role, then other tech-
niques for addressing category three error might be implemented. For example, Professor Yaroshefsky reports
from her study that "the primary influence on pretrial disclosure practices is less the law itself, but a combina-
tion of office culture and policy, and the prosecutors' own professional values." Yaroshefsky, supra note 7
(footnote omitted).
108. These biases may be implicit. For example, confirmation bias could undermine the prosecutor's ability
to appreciate the weight or importance of that exculpatory evidence.
109. See, e.g., Featured Cases, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/
#exonerated-by-dna [https://perma.cc/3LB3-7S27].
110. See, e.g., Medwed, supra note 83, at 134; Burke, Neutralizing, supra note 7, at 518 19 ("In many of
the recent exoneration cases, for example, prosecutors have continued to insist that the exonerated defendant is
guilty, even when exculpatory DNA evidence undermines the government's initial case. This seemingly inhu-
mane stubbornness can be viewed instead as a very human example of belief perseverance." (footnotes omit-
ted)); see also SIMON, supra note 14, at 31.
111. See, e.g., Burke, Neutralizing, supra note 7, at 518 19.
112. Burke, Neutralizing, supra note 7, at 515 (footnotes omitted); see also Medwed, supra note 83, at 134.
Some experimental laboratory research conducted with lay participants suggests that more serious crimes might
encourage prosecutors to "believe[] more strongly in the defendant's guilt... [believe that] obtaining a convic-
tion [is] more personally important [than in less serious offenses], and ... [encourage] misconduct more often
[than in less serious offenses]." Jeffrey W. Lucas, Corina Graif & Michael J. Lovaglia, Misconduct in the
Prosecution of Severe Crimes. Theory and Experimental Test, 69 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 97, 104 (2006). If these
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Individually and collectively, cognitive biases can contribute to what is com-
monly termed prosecutorial "tunnel vision," an individual and environmental
process that tends to focus on cementing an accused's guilt.11 3 Thus, these biases
can impair the prosecutor's ability to fulfill the Brady requirements of evaluating
the exculpatory nature of evidence and its materiality and correspondingly dis-
closing that evidence. Not surprisingly then, much current Brady scholarship now
focuses on cognitive bias as an essential, albeit not the sole, explanation of Brady
error.
114
III. THE GUILT PERSPECTIVE, COGNITIVE BIAS, AND PROPOSED REMEDIES
IN THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE
The question then becomes: What types of interventions can mitigate cognitive
bias? 15 Scholars who focus on cognitive bias as a primary factor in Brady error
have suggested a number of possible interventions.1 6 This section addresses six
of the most salient related to that bias: 1) improving charging accuracy before the
Guilt Perspective attaches; 2) professional and conviction integrity programs;
3) training on cognitive bias; 4) involving unbiased decision makers in the Brady
evaluation; 5) open-file policies; and 6) switching roles. As the focus of this
Article is on improving prosecutorial compliance with Brady, the constitutional
lodestar and minimum threshold for required discovery of evidence favorable to
results are borne out in real practice, then the seriousness of the offense may suggest the need for increasingly
proactive measures to truncate prosecutorial cognitive bias.
113. See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 7. For a discussion of questionnaire survey data investigating the
potential development of a "conviction psychology" by prosecutors, see George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor:
A Look at Reality, 7 Sw. U. L. REV. 98 (1975).
114. Burke, Neutralizing, supra note 7, at 515 ("[T]here has been increased attention to the possibility
that unintentional cognitive biases can play at least as large a role in wrongful convictions as intentional
prosecutorial misconduct. A growing literature seeks to attribute poor prosecutorial decision making to a
set of information-processing biases that we all share, rather than exclusively to ethical or moral lapses.").
115. For an analysis of interventions to address implicit bias more generally, see, e.g., Calvin C. Lai, Kelly
M. Hoffman & Brain A. Nosek, Reducing Implicit Prejudice, 7 Soc. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 315
(2013).
116. See infra notes 117 181 and accompanying text. As illustrated by some of the examples in the text,
particularly some of those in Part II above, proposed interventions to address Brady error are not necessarily
limited (or specific) to cognitive-bias driven explanations. See also, e.g., Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutorial
Disclosure Violations: Punishment vs. Treatment, 64 MERCER L. REV. 711, 720 21 (2013) (suggesting possible
use or scaling of prosecutorial mental states to determine sanctions and/or providing amnesty or immunity for
prosecutorial reporting of error); KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, PREVENTABLE ERROR: A
REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997 2009 (2010), https://digitalcommons.law.scu.
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=ncippubs [https://perma.cc/T7J4-ER8K] (suggesting a range
of interventions for prosecutorial misconduct generally, some directed toward attorneys and others directed
toward courts, including, inter alia, criminal justice attorney ethics training, internal prosecutorial office
disciplinary protocols and tracking and investigation of misconduct complaints, written, publicly accessible
prosecutorial Brady compliance policies, an ethics rule change, naming attorneys in court opinions finding
misconduct, and reducing prosecutorial immunity to a maximum of qualified, as opposed to absolute,
immunity). The literature on Brady error is extensive, and scholars have proposed many approaches to remedy
such error, of which this Article addresses only a subset.
HARNESSING VIRTUAL REALITY
the accused, the set of approaches discussed in this section does not include, inter
alia, modifying Brady itself.
A. IMPROVING CHARGING ACCURACY PRIOR TO ATTACHMENT OF GUILT
PERSPECTIVE
With respect to the first of these six interventions, Professor Burke argues that
providing as complete a collection of evidence as possible to the prosecutor
before charging might increase accuracy.117 She advocates that "police should re-
cord, preserve, and disclose to the prosecutor all evidence collected during their
investigation, both inculpatory and exculpatory." ' Correspondingly, she recom-
mends that, in more serious cases, prosecutors themselves, as is the situation in
some jurisdictions,1 9 should be actively involved in the investigation and evi-
dence collection process. 120 Under this approach, with a more comprehensive
view of the evidence before the Guilt Perspective attaches, prosecutors might be
better able to gauge the appropriateness of charging and disclosing exculpatory
evidence. Access to a more comprehensive view of the evidence before filing
seems likely to enhance initial accuracy, which is an important benefit to justice.
Moreover, increased accuracy might reduce the number of innocent individuals
who get dragged into the criminal justice process.
It is not, however, apparent that these measures would decrease the prosecu-
tor's Guilt Perspective once charges have been filed nor necessarily have a posi-
tive impact on appropriate prosecutorial disclosure of information should
additional evidence become available. Indeed, to the contrary, prosecutors who
were involved in the investigation or those who feel they have had a very compre-
hensive view of the evidence in making the charging decision may be less likely
to disengage from the Guilt Perspective once that perspective has taken hold. In
addition, both requiring police to collect and make available more evidence and
prosecutorial involvement in the investigation stage demand additional law
enforcement and prosecutorial time and resources.
Charging also has time constraints. United States Supreme Court doctrine
requires that, for individuals arrested without a warrant, a judicial determination
regarding probable cause must generally be made within forty-eight hours of the
arrest. 121 Effectively, arrestees cannot generally be held in custody for more than
forty-eight hours, excluding certain limited periods, unless charges are filed.
12 2
117. See Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at 1615.
118. Id. (footnote omitted).
119. See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role,
68 FORDHAM L. REv. 723, 724 (1999) ("Public prosecutors in this country have increasingly become involved
in the investigative stages of criminal matters during the 20th century.").
120. Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at 1615.
121. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991).
122. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 825 (2004) ("(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the defendant
shall in all cases be taken before the magistrate without unnecessary delay, and, in any event, within 48 hours
after his or her arrest, excluding Sundays and holidays. (2) When the 48 hours prescribed by paragraph
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Consequently, while Professor Burke is undoubtedly correct that police should
document and provide all available evidence to the prosecution before charging,
the forty-eight hour limit may constrain the practical likelihood of achieving this
goal in some cases. Thus, evaluators need to consider whether the benefit of
potential increased accuracy of the initial charge outweighs the cost of increased
resource expenditure of police and prosecutors, as well as the practical conse-
quences of such a policy in light of other constraints.
To the extent that Professor Burke's recommendation of providing a more
comprehensive data set to the prosecutor prior to charging is feasible, without
undue expenditure of resources or delay, it should increase accuracy in the charg-
ing process and might postpone the onset of a Guilt Perspective through a critical
phase of the evaluation of evidence.
B. PROFESSIONAL AND CONVICTION INTEGRITY PROGRAMS
Professor Scheck recommends tackling cognitive bias (and several other
Brady) challenges through professional and conviction integrity programs, pro-
grams that draw upon similar review and compliance approaches in medical care
and business. 123 These would involve reforms within a prosecutor's office.
Proposed reforms range from careful implementation of checklists to clarifying
the scope of required discovery within offices to review of "near misses"124 and
Brady failures.1 21 More generally, the contemplated reforms aim to put explicit
procedures in place that support both prophylactic approaches to avoid Brady
error and careful review when such error or "near misses" have occurred.1 26
Like the proposal above for increased access to evidence before charging, such
programs seek change where change is likely to have real impact, within the pros-
ecutor's office itself. They recognize how cognitive bias can permeate evidence
evaluations. They aim to integrate devices for making documentation of evidence
more automatic and easier for prosecutors, for example, phones that simplify the
recording of witness statements.1 27 They respect prosecutorial responsibilities
and esprit de corps.1 28 To the extent, as suggested by Professor Yaroshefsky's
research discussed above, that high caseloads and other limited resources cur-
rently undermine effective Brady evaluations within prosecutorial offices, these
(1) expire at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting is not in session, that time shall be extended
to include the duration of the next court session on the judicial day immediately following. If the 48-hour period
expires at a time when the court in which the magistrate is sitting is in session, the arraignment may take place
at any time during that session. However, when the defendant's arrest occurs on a Wednesday after the conclu-
sion of the day's court session, and if the Wednesday is not a court holiday, the defendant shall be taken before
the magistrate not later than the following Friday, if the Friday is not a court holiday.").
123. Scheck, supra note 33, at 2216 17.
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., id.
126. Id.
127. Scheck, supra note 33, at 2232.
128. Professor Scheck refers to being able to reflect and discuss in .'protected space."' Id. at 2224.
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concerns about resource limitations, however, might also apply to some of the
components of the programs recommended by Professor Scheck. Nonetheless,
some jurisdictions have implemented conviction integrity programs and best
practices committees, and reports about their effectiveness more generally have
been quite favorable. 129 These programs, depending on their specific scope, can
offer a variety of valuable protective strategies against Brady error, but may be
highly resource intensive approaches for an individual prosecutor's office.
C. COGNITIVE BIAS TRAINING
Empirical research supports the value of training regimens in some contexts to
help individuals reduce their cognitive bias.130 As a consequence, Brady scholars
and researchers in other disciplines recommend educating people about their own
biases.13 1 Nonetheless, even advocates of such an approach recognize it has limi-
tations. Professor Burke explains that "although education about cognitive bias
may hold some potential to improve prosecutorial decision making, it is doubtful
that education alone will assure prosecutorial neutrality. ' 13 2 While recognizing
that such training is not a panacea, to the extent that such training can be imple-
mented in a cost-effective way, this approach seems worth including in the set of
available remedies to Brady failure.
D. INVOLVING UNBIASED DECISION MAKERS
One scholar recommends involving unbiased decision makers in the evidence
evaluation process by turning the decisions over to a neutral, in particular a judi-
cial, decision maker.133 In another variation of this approach, the disclosure
129. For a discussion of such programs, see, e.g., Daniel Kroepsch, Prosecutorial Best Practices
Committees and Conviction Integrity Units: How Internal Programs are Fulfilling the Prosecutor's Duty to
Serve Justice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1095, 1105 (2016).
130. See, e.g., Laurie A. Rudman, Richard D. Ashmore & Melvin L. Gary, "Unlearning" Automatic
Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOI. 856, 861
(2001) ("Students exposed to coursework and class discussion designed to foster respect for diversity showed a
significant reduction in both their prejudice and stereotype IAT scores."); Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at
1617 18 (discussing Lee Ross, Mark R. Lepper & Michael Hubbard, Perseverance in Self-Perception and
Social Perception: Biased Attributional Processes in the Debriefing Paradigm, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 880, 882 (1975)). Consider also Sophia Lebrecht, Lara J. Pierce, Michael J. Tarr & James W.
Tanaka, Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial Bias, 4 PLoS ONE 1, 1 (2009). Not all
research in which participants were exposed to information or policies about bias or harassment suggests that
such exposure reduces bias. See, e.g., Justine Eatenson Tinkler, Yan E. Li & Stefanie Mollborn, Can Legal
Interventions Change Beliefs? The Effect of Exposure to Sexual Harassment Policy on Men's Gender Beliefs,
70 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 480, 491 (2007) (reporting that exposing men to sexual harassment policy "strengthen
[ed] male-advantaged gender beliefs, though only implicitly rather than explicitly").
131. Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at 1616-18.
132. Id. at 1618; see also Stanley P. Williams, Jr., Double-Blind Justice: A Scientific Solution to Criminal
Bias in the Courtroom, 6 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 48, 62 63, 69 (2018) (discussing limitations of bias aware-
ness training, particularly in the context of training judges, and more generally proposing a double-blind
approach where "both the judge and jury will no longer view or hear the defendant, except when the defendant
testifies" to reduce bias in the courtroom).
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decision is subject to review by persons other than the line prosecutor who is han-
dling the specific case.134 These persons could include a supervisor or committee
of prosecutors.13 One can readily perceive value in Brady disclosure to involving
decision makers for whom the Guilt Perspective is not (yet) entrenched.
In the first iteration of this approach, Brady discovery disclosure would lie in
the realm of the judge, who, through an in camera proceeding would "review ...
all information in the prosecutor's custody." '136 This could largely exempt prose-
cutors from having to evaluate the evidence for disclosure purposes.137 Such an
approach would likely mitigate the effects of cognitive bias on the disclosure pro-
cess. The judge would play the single role of evaluator, rather than the dual role
of evaluator and advocate. For some prosecutors, being relieved of this obligation
would be a blessing, withdrawing them from difficult judgment calls and from
the personally contentious litigation about their decisions on disclosure post-con-
viction. Correspondingly, however, substantial resources would be needed at the
judicial level to evaluate evidence in the millions of cases in which a prosecutor's
office performs that function currently,"' not to mention the likely overhead that
would be needed in prosecutors' offices to prepare the evidence for such judicial
review. In addition, to the extent that key Brady evidence remains with other law
enforcement actors and does not arrive in the prosecutor's file, judicial determina-
tions of disclosable evidence based on the contents of a prosecutor's file are
unlikely to provide adequate disclosure.
In the second iteration, one that might function as part of the larger professional
and conviction integrity process discussed earlier, in addition to a line prosecutor's
review, a supervisor or group of prosecutors would review the evidence.139 To the
extent that those individuals are not invested in the particular case in the same
way as the line prosecutor and do not possess a Guilt Perspective at the time of
such review, their involvement may enable a detour around the cognitive biases
that can descend with the rooting of the Guilt Perspective. Moreover, internal
reviews may cause less reactance or negative response by a line prosecutor.
Because much Brady error presumably goes undetected, having the detection
procedure be an internal one may encourage disclosure as the recommendations
are made by colleagues who share the same specific roles and mission and before
133. See Capra, supra note 74, at 397 98.
134. See, e.g., Findley & Scott, supra note 7, at 389. See generally id. at 389 n.498 and accompanying text
(citing Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication,
93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1619 21 (2005)).
135. Id. at 389.
136. See Capra, supra note 74, at 397 98.
137. Except perhaps for requests for protective orders.
138. See RICHARD Y. SCHAUFFLER, ROBERT C. LAFOUNTAIN, SHAUNA M. STRICKLAND, KATHRYN A. HOLT
& KATHRYN J. GENTHON, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS (2016),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/-/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC%202015.ashx [https://perma.cc/W5NE-
675Y] (providing a chart showing millions of cases in incoming caseloads for state courts in 2015).
139. See Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at 1621.
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there are public accusations of failure to disclose. Nonetheless, an entirely inter-
nal process also risks having evaluators who are prone to the same Guilt
Perspective as the line prosecutor, particularly on a case that has already been
charged. This risk of being unintentionally co-opted applies not just to prosecu-
tors but perhaps even to outsiders who might regularly join such review
committees.
One might explore the possibility of adding a defense attorney to such a review
committee, in hopes that such co-optation would not occur. Having a defense at-
torney reviewing evidence poses other challenges, like those involving conflicts
of interest and inappropriate access to confidential information, but might be
worth considering. Nonetheless, each of the review processes described would
require resources, potentially substantial resources, to be effective, depending on
the scope and number of cases subject to such review.
E. OPEN-FILE POLICIES
One method that has been proposed to avoid Brady error anticipates prosecu-
tors opening their own and/or related law enforcement files to the defense and dis-
closing all evidence, which is not otherwise protected by other rules, orders, or
policies. From a logical standpoint, the open-file policy or disclose-all-non-
protected-evidence approach, if scrupulously applied, is probably the most likely
of those discussed so far to result in existing evidence that is favorable to the
accused being disclosed, and, correspondingly, the fewest Brady errors. Scholars
note that the number of jurisdictions that have adopted open-file approaches still
represents fewer than half of the states, but that interest in more expansive discov-
ery is growing."'
Scholars have also recently turned their attention to conducting research on
the impact of this approach.141 Professors Turner and Redlich, for example, com-
pare the pre-plea statutorily-imposed open-file approach in North Carolina with
what they characterize as a more traditional approach in Virginia.14 2 They note
140. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 76, at 304 (identifying seventeen states with a type of open-file dis-
covery policy and describing those as still "a minority," but explaining that "the trend in recent years is in the
direction of broader and earlier discovery").
141. Turner & Redlich, supra note 76, at 314 ("We have uncovered only five empirical studies of discovery
practices, and while these studies provided important information on certain aspects of discovery, none aims to
address the questions above in a comprehensive manner." (citing and describing in the accompanying footnote,
LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., A SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES: FINAL REPORT TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES (2011); N.Y. CTY. LAWYERS' ASS'N, DISCOVERY IN NEW YORK
CRIMINAL COURTS: SURVEY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2006); William Bradford Middlekauff, What
Practitioners Say About Broad Criminal Discovery Practice: More Just-Or Just More Dangerous?, 9 CRIM.
JUST. 14 (1994); TEX. CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS ASS'N & MANAGING TO EXCELLENCE CORP., THE COST OF
COMPLIANCE: A LOOK AT THE FISCAL IMPACT AND PROCESS CHANGES OF THE MICHAEL MORTON ACT IV-V
(2015); TEX. DEF. SERV. & TEX. APPLESEED, IMPROVING DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES IN TEXAS: HOW BEST
PRACTICES CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER JUSTICE (2013)).
142. Id. at 373 80.
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that their survey revealed that, as one might expect, "[o]pen-file rules appear to
make the most difference where the exculpatory nature of the evidence is not
obvious." '143 Their findings also "suggest that neither open-file nor closed-file
rules ensure consistent disclosure of Brady evidence when the evidence is in the
possession of investigating agencies, rather than prosecutors." '144 The researchers
further indicate that they "found little evidence to suggest that open-file discovery
increases risks to the safety of witnesses.""14 Overall, they conclude that "[w]hile
the open-file system may not always produce better disclosure of impeachment or
all categories of exculpatory evidence, it does generally enhance disclosure of
most types of evidence. It also appears to reduce discovery disputes and promote
speedier dispositions of cases." '146
The researchers acknowledge a number of "[m]ethodological [c]aveats," '147
including that their survey-based study "tests perceptions of discovery practices
rather than directly monitoring the practices themselves." '48 In a published cri-
tique of the study, Professor Miriam Baer also raises caveats about the study,
including concerns about the sample size and about the generalizability of the
results, related to, inter alia, possible selection and status quo biases.149 For
example, Professor Baer laments that prosecutors in large urban areas with com-
plex cases and often corresponding concerns of witness intimidation "very likely
did not participate in the study at all."150
A Virginia prosecutor also published a response to Professors Turner and
Redlich's article, expressing concerns about the survey.51 A number of the con-
cers in that response, whose title suggests that it represents views of Virginia
prosecutors more generally, echoed concerns surfaced by Professor Baer.1 2
Another study of open-file approaches examines outcomes for defendants in
two jurisdictions which have open-file policies.5 3 According to the study, and
as viewed through a proxy of suppression litigation, although evidentiary dis-
closure does appear to increase in those jurisdictions,5 4 Professor Grunwald
143. Id. at 295.
144. Id. at 296.
145. Id. at 383.
146. Id. at 297.
147. Id. at 373.
148. Id. at 374.
149. See Miriam H. Baer, Some Skepticism About Criminal Discovery Empiricism, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 347, 349 (2016).
150. Id. at 352.
151. See Michael R. Doucette, Virginia Prosecutors' Response to Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in
Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 415 (2016).
152. Id. at 416 20. Mr. Doucette also raises a number of concerns beyond those in Professor Baer's
response. For Professors Turner and Redlich's reply addressing concerns raised by both Mr. Doucette and
Professor Baer, see Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Reply to Miriam Baer and Michael Doucette's
Reviews of Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 471, 471
(2016).
153. Grunwald, supra note 77, at 810.
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reports "relatively little evidence that defendants fared significantly better in
terms of charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing, or that the trial rate or
time-to-disposition fell as a result of open-file." ' As a result of his research,
Professor Grunwald opines that:
effects of open-file are fragile and contingent on a range of extrinsic institu-
tional circumstances: most importantly, on the availability of resources for
public defense; on the myopia of police investigations; and on the adaptive
behavior of police and prosecutors in the collection of evidence and assembly
of the file. As a result, open-file may not work as a standalone fix.156
An open-file policy relieves the prosecutor of some decision making about evi-
dence disclosure. Whether particular evidence should be exempt or merits seek-
ing a protective order generally remains within prosecutorial discretion even in
open-file jurisdictions, and research suggests that jurisdictions have adopted a va-
riety of avenues to protect witnesses within such jurisdictions. 5 7 Whether open-
file policies fully resolve Brady error concerns remains subject to debate. For
example, one worry that has been expressed is that such policies might discour-
age evidence collection by law enforcement: "[I]f police and prosecutors can pre-
dict the probability that investigative activities produce exculpatory evidence,
they may be less likely to engage in those activities that are likely to produce it.
And, if they find exculpatory evidence, they may be less likely to record, collect,
or insert it into the file.",1 5 8 The literature also reflects concern that "[i]mplement-
ing open-file discovery is costly for prosecutor's offices, which may already be
operating under tight budgets. Due to limited resources, a prosecutor's office may
file charges in fewer cases. 159 Moreover, if a focus on Brady were no longer part
of the prosecutorial calculus on a regular basis, prosecutors might not be as atten-
tive to ensuring that casual conversations with witnesses or impeachment materi-
als in general get documented. As above, open-file policies also generate
concerns about witness safety. 6 °
The data and analysis presented here introduce the importance of research on
the attributes of open-file approaches. More is needed as the debate about its
154. Id. at 808 10.
155. Id. at 777.
156. Id. at 777 78.
157. Id. at 793 94 (describing a variety of mechanisms for protecting witnesses).
158. Id. at 797 (footnote omitted).
159. Grunwald, supra note 77, at 798; Turner & Redlich, supra note 76, at 311 (raising concerns about bur-
den on prosecutors and noting that "[o]pen-file discovery is also expected to require additional manpower to
redact documents containing sensitive information and to litigate protective measures").
160. Turner & Redlich, supra note 76, at 309 10 (footnote omitted) ("The first and chief concern is that
open-file discovery endangers witness safety and witness privacy and therefore conflicts with the government's
duty to protect the public. Relatedly, opponents of open-file worry that disclosure of witness information would
discourage some citizens from cooperating with law enforcement and jeopardize the integrity of
investigations.").
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value and effectiveness continues. Ideally, by disclosing all evidence not exempt
or within the scope of a protective order, a scrupulously applied open-file
approach, especially one implemented through early or pre-plea discovery and
coupled with a similar expectation about related law enforcement files, could sub-
stantially decrease Brady violations.
Most importantly in terms of the question of prosecutors' cognitive bias, while
a trend toward greater disclosure and open-file policies is in progress, researchers
suggest that most jurisdictions, including the federal government through the
Offices of the United States Attorneys, have not adopted such policies.161 Some
may, indeed, be disinclined to adopt such policies. Consequently, while open-file
policies may, depending on the results of further research, represent a sought-
after, long-term ideal, 16 2 in the interim, Brady violations persist in jurisdictions
across the nation. Moreover, even open-file policies depend upon decision mak-
ing by prosecutors, decision making in which the Guilt Perspective and ensuing
161. Id. at 304-06; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL §§ 9-5.000 9-5.002, https://www.
justice.gov/usam/usam-9-5000-issues-related-trials-and-other-court-proceedings [https://perma.cc/ELZ4-4Z37]:
Providing broad and early discovery often promotes the truth-seeking mission of the Department
and fosters a speedy resolution of many cases. It also provides a margin of error in case the prose-
cutor's good faith determination of the scope of appropriate discovery is in error. Prosecutors are
encouraged to provide broad and early discovery consistent with any countervailing considera-
tions. But when considering providing discovery beyond that required by the discovery obligations
or providing discovery sooner than required, prosecutors should always consider any appropriate
countervailing concerns in the particular case, including, but not limited to: protecting victims and
witnesses from harassment or intimidation; protecting the privacy interests of witnesses; protecting
privileged information; protecting the integrity of ongoing investigations; protecting the trial from
efforts at obstruction: protecting national security interests; investigative agency concerns; enhanc-
ing the likelihood of receiving reciprocal discovery by defendants; any applicable legal or eviden-
tiary privileges; and other strategic considerations that enhance the likelihood of achieving a just
result in a particular case .... Prosecutors should never describe the discovery being provided as
"open file." Even if the prosecutor intends to provide expansive discovery, it is always possible
that something will be inadvertently omitted from production and the prosecutor will then have
unintentionally misrepresented the scope of materials provided. Furthermore, because the concept
of the "file" is imprecise, such a representation exposes the prosecutor to broader disclosure
requirements than intended or to sanction for failure to disclose documents, e.g., agent notes or in-
ternal memos, that the court may deem to have been part of the "file." When the disclosure obliga-
tions are not clear or when the considerations above conflict with the discovery obligations,
prosecutors may seek a protective order from the court addressing the scope, timing, and form of
disclosures.
Id. at § 9.5002.
162. In a very recent study, unpublished at the time the summary was sent to the author, in a controlled labo-
ratory setting, Professor Allison Redlich and Samantha Luna explored, inter alia, whether telling participants
(university students) that they worked as prosecutors in an open-file (versus a "closed-file") discovery jurisdic-
tion affected their disclosure of the four pieces of exculpatory evidence in a mock case. ALLISON D. REDLICH &
SAMANTHA LUNA, INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY (2018) (result sum-
mary from Redlich on file with author). The researchers report that "[m]ock prosecutors in open-file conditions
[were] less likely to commit prosecutorial misconduct" as measured by disclosure of the items of exculpatory
evidence to the defense. Id. More generally, the researchers write that "[a]lthough in need of replication with
actual prosecutors, [their] findings suggest that open-file discovery resulted in increased discovery to the
defense, lower likelihood of potential misconduct, and more lenient plea offers." Id.
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cognitive biases may still frustrate necessary disclosure. Thus, attention to reduc-
ing prosecutorial cognitive bias remains an essential inquiry.
F. SWITCHING ROLES
One of the most provocative and potentially effective methods proposed for
disrupting the Guilt Perspective, which can give rise to the cascade of cognitive
biases, is that of switching roles. Switching roles is a form of perspective taking,
an approach that has been the subject of substantial cognitive science research.163
In the cognitive science literature, traditional mental simulation perspective
taking involves "the process of imagining the world from another person's per-
spective." '164 Such perspective taking may involve imagining how another feels
or perceives the world or it may more directly involve imagining yourself as the
other.165 Although there remains debate about some of the precise cognitive
mechanisms involved in understanding "how perspective taking encourages pro-
social behavior and empathy, '  research suggests that "[p]erspective taking ...
is a powerful intervention technique that has been used to reduce the accessibility
of stereotypes and negative outgroup attitudes.
167
For example, researchers report that such perspective taking can produce "pos-
itive empathetic feelings ' 168 even toward members of a "highly stigmatized
group. ' 169 In one such experiment, participants listened to an audiotape of an
individual, who ostensibly was a convicted murderer, explain the crime and his
163. For research on perspective taking, see, for example, infra notes 164 176 and accompanying text.
164. Oh et al., supra note 17, at 399.
165. Herrera et al., supra note 18, at 2 3.
166. Oh et al., supra note 17, at 399.
167. Id. (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Andrew Todd, Galen V. Bodenhausen, Jennifer A. Richeson & Adam
D. Galinsky, Perspective Taking Combats Automatic Expressions of Racial Bias, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1027, 1038 (2011) (reporting that "[r]esults obtained across five experiments using two different per-
spective-taking manipulations; two different comparison conditions; and a combination of self-report, latency-based,
and behavioral dependent measures-consistently document the merits of perspective taking for generating more
favorable automatic interracial evaluations, approach-avoidance tendencies, and interpersonal behaviors"). But
researchers report that "perspective taking can change dramatically depending on the relational context (i.e., cooper-
ation vs. competition)." Jason R. Pierce, Favin J. Kilduff, Adam D. Galinsky & Niro Sivanathan, From Glue to
Gasoline. How Competition Turns Perspective Takers Unethical, 24 PSYCHOL. SC. 1986 (2013). The researchers
opine that "[allthough perspective taking has long been thought of as the glue that binds people together, our experi-
ments demonstrate that it can also act as gasoline that fuels competitive and self-protective impulses, leading to de-
ceptive and exploitative behavior, possibly as a prophylactic against exploitation by others." Id. at 1993. In other
studies, researchers reported that perspective taking can "diminish egocentric assessments of fairness." Nicholas
Epley, Eugene M. Caruso & Max H. Bazerman, When Perspective Taking Increases Taking. Reactive Egosim in
Social Interaction, 91 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 886 (2006). But they report that, in a competitive con-
text, it could also trigger reactive egoism. Id. Context will thus be of significant importance in designing experiments
related to prosecutorial perspective taking.
168. C. Daniel Batson, Marina P. Polycarpou, Eddie Harmon-Jones, Heidi J. Imhoff, Erin C. Mitchener,
Lori L. Bednar, Tricia R. Klein & Lori Highberger, Empathy and Attitudes. Can Feeling for a Member of a
Stigmatized Group Improve Feelings Toward the Group?, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105, 177
(1997).
169. Id. at 116.
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current reflections on it.170 Participants in the condition that was focused on high
empathy were asked to imagine how the speaker felt and to "' [t]ry to feel the full
impact of what this [person] has been through and how [the person] feels as a
result.'"171 Researchers reported that "although there was only limited evidence
of an effect of inducing empathy for a convicted murderer on attitudes toward
murderers measured immediately, there was clear evidence of an effect 1 to 2
weeks later. ' 172 Consistent with the research above involving imagining another
person's experience, researchers also explain that "[e]xplicitly assuming the per-
spective of a member of an out-group and imagining oneself as that person can
reduce stereotypes about that out-group. "173
With respect to perspective taking generally, researchers contend that "one of
the strongest implications of perspective taking is increased self-other overlap, or
greater overlap between mental representations of the self and other people.
People were more likely to ascribe their traits to a target person when they had
previously engaged in a perspective taking exercise[.] ' 174 Professor Bailenson
indicates that "[t]hinking similarly to another person literally causes changes in
cognitive structures, such that one's thoughts concerning the other become more
'selflike' 1 7 ' Thus, ascribing one's own traits to another can make it easier to con-
nect to and feel positive about the other.
1 76
170. Id. at 114.
171. Id. at 108, 114.
172. Id. at 116.
173. GROOM ET AL., supra note 18, at 3; Harry Farmer & Lara Maister, Putting Ourselves in Another's Skin.
Using the Plasticity of Self-Perception to Enhance Empathy and Decrease Prejudice, 30 Soc. JUST. RES. 323,
337 (2017) ("[Perspective-taking] not only leads to a reduction in prejudice against others, but it appears to
achieve this by creating a new association between the self and that other."). Not all research reaches the same
conclusions. See, e.g., id. at 337 38 (describing and critiquing a study that did not lead to prejudice reduction
as using a "relatively basic" approach and contrasting it with more immersive approaches, which often,
although not uniformly, find reductions in bias); Herrera et al., supra note 18, at 3 (noting perspective taking
studies that, in certain contexts, led to increases in stereotyping).
174. Oh et al., supra note 17, at 399 (describing and citing the research of Adam D. Galinsky, Gillian Ku &
Cynthia S. Wang, Perspective-Taking and Self-Other Overlap. Fostering Social Bonds and Facilitating Social
Coordination, 8 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 109 (2005) and Mark H. Davis, Laura Conklin,
Amy Smith & Carol Luce, Effect of Perspective Taking on the Cognitive Representation of Persons. A
Merging of Self and Other, 70 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 713 (1996)). Recent scholarship contends that
"there is now strong evidence that this change in attitudes is driven by an increase in self-association towards
the other rather than alternative possibilities such as an increase in empathy for the other person." Farmer &
Maister, supra note 173, at 337.
175. BAILENSON, supra note 20, at 82.
176. See, e.g., Farmer & Maister, supra note 173, at 340-41 (describing studies that "highlight the role that
embodiment can play in blurring the boundaries between self and other and its value in changing both attitudes
and more low-level bodily responses towards other social groups and individuals"); Davis et al., supra note 174,
at 718 ("Taken as a whole, the findings offer some support for the notion that perspective taking leads observers
to attribute a greater proportion of their self-descriptors to other, unfamiliar individuals, and that the net result of
this process is a greater level of overlap between the cognitive representations of self and target."). Recent
research suggests, however, that perspective taking may not increase accuracy in forecasting the views of a part-
ner. Tal Eyal, Mary Steffel & Nicholas Epley, Perspective Mistaking. Accurately Understanding the Mind of
Another Requires Getting Perspective, Not Taking Perspective, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 547, 561
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Switching roles may assume a variety of forms. Professor Burke, for example,
recommends that prosecutors engage in the common law school exercise of play-
ing "devil's advocate" ' and "generating pro-defense counterarguments to [a
prosecutor's] own ... interpretations of the evidence against the defendant." '178
Given the research on perspective taking, this straightforward exercise could help
a prosecutor to better understand possible defense theories and the evidence that
might support them and encourage recognition of Brady evidence.17 9
More literal role switches might also be considered. As former Justice
O'Connor noted in another context, barristers in Britain work as defense counsel
as well as prosecutors and may change sides depending on the case.18 This ele-
vates the perspective-taking approach to a different level. Based on the studies on
perspective taking more generally, it is reasonably likely that such a flip would
increase empathy and self-other overlap, thereby modifying the Guilt
Perspective, and reducing subsequent cognitive bias against the accused. While
prosecutors in the U.S. do, with some frequency, leave their offices and become
defense counsel, in general, it is fairly rare to make such a switch on a short-term,
temporary basis. Moreover, the practical logistics and obstacles to this version of
role switching, particularly as a required component of prosecutorial work, are
formidable. Concerns here include those of clients about attorney loyalty, con-
flicts, effective assistance of counsel, and competence in the wake of the initial
switch. In addition, the financial costs to an office and emotional resistance of
many prosecutors would likely be substantial.11
With respect to these two types of perspective-taking options, playing devil's
advocate is a worthwhile and low-cost option, although perhaps not powerful
enough to significantly alter an entrenched Guilt Perspective. Moreover, it may
be that those prosecutors with the most entrenched Guilt Perspective are least
amenable to engaging effectively in the exercise. Certainly, we would benefit
from further empirical evaluation of this inexpensive option. In contrast, the
actual switching of roles seems too costly and likely unappealing as an option for
many prosecutors (not to mention for some defenders whose jobs the prosecutors
(2018) ("Across nine experiments consisting of naturalistic tests of interpersonal accuracy predicting a part-
ner's preferences and opinions we found that an explicit instruction to engage in perspective taking did not
increase accuracy. If anything, it decreased accuracy.").
177. Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at 1620.
178. Id. at 1618 20; see also Findley & Scott, supra note 7, at 388 89.
179. For a discussion of benefits and risks of using alternative hypotheses in criminal investigations to try to
debias confirmation bias, see SIMON, supra note 14, at 45. For recommendations, which are informed by an
analysis of much research on cognitive bias and its impact on the criminal justice system and which aim to
enhance accuracy in the criminal justice process and the results it generates, see, for example, id. at 204 22.
180. Emma Schwartz, Justice O'Connor's Wish: A Wand, Not a Gavel, U.S. NEwS (Nov. 7, 2007), https://
www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2007/11/07/justice-oconnors-wish-a-wand-not-a-gavel (last visited
Mar. 7, 2019).
181. It is also possible that defense attorneys could switch sides to become prosecutors, carrying with them
the advantages of a defense perspective into their prosecutorial decision-making.
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might be taking). Therefore, resistance to implementation would probably be
high.
Each of the six approaches discussed above has valuable potential to reduce
Brady error. They operate in different ways, with some attempting to dislodge or
modify the Guilt Perspective and others largely potentially bypassing it, through,
for example, open-file disclosure. Each, however, has its own costs or limitations
that may prevent or limit its implementation or effectiveness. Consequently, addi-
tional approaches merit consideration. Part IV below explores a low overhead,
potentially time-effective and cost-efficient approach that might modify the Guilt
Perspective and resulting cognitive biases to change prosecutorial behavior to
increase appropriate disclosure.
IV. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH ON VIRTUAL REALITY, EMBODIED
PERSPECTIVE TAKING, AND DIGITAL AVATARS
Emerging innovations in cognitive science research suggest that immersive
virtual environments can modify one's perspective and reduce cognitive bias.
18 2
As discussed above, researchers have long employed the technique of perspective
taking to try to enhance empathy and reduce cognitive bias. 8 3 Inhabiting an ava-
tar represents a radically enhanced form of traditional perspective taking.
Empirical research using digital avatars, when appropriately designed and
engaged, has shown significant reductions in explicit and implicit bias, both im-
mediately and at least in short-term subsequent behavior of participants. 8 4
Because experimenters see significant changes with a single engagement of less
than twenty minutes,8 5 if these innovative approaches can be applied to the pro-
cess involved in prosecutorial decision making, they might produce significant,
rapid, and positive change in terms of reduction of the bias that may distort infor-
mation processing. If appropriate modification of the Guilt Perspective can be
achieved, prosecutors may more readily recognize the favorable nature of evi-
dence and be more inclined to disclose that evidence.
A. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON DIGITAL AVATARS AND COGNITIVE BIAS
Avatars represent a primary medium of engagement in the virtual world today.
These, often anthropomorphized, animated, three-dimensional representations,
enable individuals, like video game players and research participants, to take on
the "body" and persona of others in a computer-generated virtual reality. 8 6 The
182. See, e.g., Aln et al., supra note 19, at 30 31; Banakou et al., supra note 18, at 10; Beatrice S. Hasler,
Bernhard Spanlang & Mel Slater, Virtual Race Transformation Reverses Racial In-Group Bias, 12 PLoS ONE
1, 12 (2017); Peck et al., supra note 19. But see GROOM ET AL., supra note 18, at 15.
183. See supra notes 164-176 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Banakou et al., supra note 18; Aln et al, supra note 19, at 30; Farmer & Maister, supra note
173, at 340-42.
185. See, e.g., Aln et al., supra note 19.
186. Scarborough & Bailenson, supra note 22, at 130.
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participant's avatar could be taller, younger, older, of a different race or ethnicity or
gender, or a dragon or an elf, almost as different from the participant's original self
as one could imagine. In an immersive virtual environment, researchers create the
avatar in a "computer-generated environment in which the user can perceive, feel
and interact in a manner that is similar to a physical place. ' 1 7 The goal is to develop
a fully immersive experience in which the artificial computer-generated setting and
space substitute for, and temporarily become, the real world for the participant. One
might imagine entering the Holodeck in a Star Trek episode, except that the partici-
pant can also take on a new body appearance and persona in the form of an avatar.188
Avatars allow researchers to create a near infinite variety of embodied perspective-
taking experiences to investigate human perceptions and behavior.
Research suggests that "[b]ehavioral changes that are caused by avatars have
been demonstrated to include both immediate adaptive changes ' " 9 as well as
"longitudinal changes that can be measured over time. ' 90 Specifically, "the
appearance and behavior of an avatar has been demonstrated to have immediate
effects on the behavior of the user."' 9 Professors Jeremy Bailenson and Nick
Yee label this the "Proteus effect. '192 It describes the participant's experience of
internalizing or transferring some dimensions of that virtual experience into the
participant's real-world lived experience. Virtual reality researchers explain that
"embodying another person is fundamentally different than imagining oneself as
another person."' 93 Because of the intensity of the immersive experience, avatars
are a bit like traditional perspective taking on steroids.1 94
Empirical research on the impact of virtual reality on perception and behavior
is a young but rapidly growing discipline within academia. Research spans inves-
tigations from the impact of avatars on racial bias and on bias against the elderly
and homeless persons to using avatars to reduce consumer consumption of prod-
ucts that have a negative impact on the environment and to increasing individual
commitment to exercise.' 9' As an introduction to this discipline and its potential
187. Parsons et al., supra note 18, at 2.
188. Analogies to the Holodeck in Star Trek are not uncommon in the literature on virtual reality and neuro-
science. See, e.g., Michael J. Tarr & William H. Warren, Virtual Reality in Behavioral Neuroscience and
Beyond, 5 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE SUPPLEMENT 1089, 1089 (2002).
189. Scarborough & Bailenson, supra note 22, at 130 (citing Yee & Bailenson, supra note 18).
190. Id. at 130 (citing Jesse Fox & Jeremy N. Bailenson, Virtual Self-Modeling: The Effects of Vicarious
Reinforcement and Identification on Exercise Behaviors, 12 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 1 (2009)).
191. Id. at 131.
192. Id.
193. GROOM ET AL., supra note 18, at 14.
194. For a discussion of the potency of IVEs, see, for example, supra note 19 and accompanying text. The
steroid Oxytocin itself has also been the subject of study in the context of perspective taking and avatars. See,
e.g., Tong Yue, Yuhan Jiang, Caizhen Yue & Xiting Huang, Differential Effects of Oxytocin on Visual
Perspective Taking for Men and Women, 11 FRONTIERS BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 1, 1 (2017) ("investigat[ing]
the effects of OXT [Oxytocin] on men and women in visual perspective taking tasks").
195. See infra notes 196 261. Scholars have also been turning their attention to surveying existing applica-
tions and proposing and evaluating innovative new applications of virtual reality in and for the justice system.
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application to the Brady context, we consider several pertinent research studies
here.
1. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON DIGITAL AVATARS, COGNITIVE BIAS, AND RACE
Over the course of evolution, humans have developed a keen sense of self and
other as well as of "intergroup bias, the systematic tendency to favor the ingroup
over the outgroup." '19 6 A number of essential studies in this domain focus on
addressing bias by members of in-groups towards members of out-groups.197
Distinguishing and favoring a group with which one affiliates oneself can serve
positive functions in a variety of contexts.198 It risks, of course, negative conse-
quences as well, including diminished empathy and understanding of those in the
out-group, and increased stigmatization and alienation of out-group members.1 99
Perspective taking offers a well-researched technique for in-group members to
See, e.g., Jeremy Bailenson, Jim Blascovich, Andrew C. Beall & Beth Noveck, Courtroom Applications of
Virtual Environments, Immersive Virtual Environments, and Collaborative Virtual Environments, 28 LAW &
PoL'Y. 249, 249 50, 262 65 (2006) (advocating for adoption of virtual reality uses in the courtroom, arguing
that "this technology offers practical advantages for recreating crime and accident scenes, preparing witnesses,
and experts, and conducting police lineups" as well as noting potential limitations and drawbacks); ADAM
BENFORADO, UNFAIR: THE NEW SCIENCE OF CRIMINAL INJUSTICE 267 70 (2015) (advocating for virtual reality
approaches to a variety of criminal justice processes, including virtual trials in which all the participants are vir-
tual actors); Jay P. Kennedy & Bobbie Ticknor, Studying Corporate Crime: Making the Case for Virtual
Reality, 7 INT'L J. CRIM. JUST. ScI. 416, 417 (2012) ("argu[ing] that the use of virtual reality (VR) as a meth-
odological tool will greatly advance the study [of] corporate crime"); Carrie Leonetti & Jeremy Bailenson,
High-Tech View: The Use of Immersive Virtual Environments in Jury Trials, 93 MARQ. L. REv. 1073, 1074,
1076 (2010) (exploring "whether immersive-virtual-environment (IVE) technology could be designed for and
used during a jury trial" and noting that "[t]he power of an IVE, however, can be a double-edged sword" with
jurors potentially accessing "a better understanding of the material facts at issue" or perhaps "risk[ing] manipu-
lation or undue influence [as a result of] the experiential nature of VR" (footnote omitted)); Bobbie Ticknor &
Sherry Tillinghast, Virtual Reality and the Criminal Justice System: New Possibilities for Research, Training,
and Rehabilitation, 4 J. VIRTUAL WORLDS RES. 4 (2011). For example, in their 2011 article, Professor Bobbie
Ticknor and Sherry Tillinghast discuss, inter alia, use by researchers to enhance replicability and validity of ex-
perimental procedures, use for training law enforcement in "scenarios that they are likely to experience while
in the field," id. at 14, and use "to enhance the skills required to manage offenders in a variety of situations,"
id., as well as uses for treatment and rehabilitation of offenders in a wide range of contexts, id. at 9 28. In her
2018 book, Professor Ticknor provides a focused discussion of current and potential uses of virtual reality in
the correctional system for rehabilitative purposes. BOBBIE TICKNOR, VIRTUAL REALITY AND THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM: EXPLORING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR CORRECTIONAL REHABILITATION (2018). In a recent pilot
study, Professor Ticknor used VR to provide cognitive behavior therapy for juvenile offenders in a residential
treatment program. Bobbie Ticknor, Pilot 1.0: Creating a Virtual Environment for the Treatment of Offenders,
CORRECTIONS TODAY (May 1, 2017), https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Pilot+1.0%3A+Creating+a+virtual+
environment+for+the+treatment+of...-a0491848170 [https://perma.cc/XM92-63QE].
196. Oh et al., supra note 17, at 398 (emphasis omitted). Human behavior is, of course, incredibly complex.
For an analysis of the subject, including insights and research about in-group and out-group dynamics and em-
pathy, see ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR BEST AND WORST 387-424,
521 52 (2017).
197. See, e.g., Oh et al., supra note 17, at 398.
198. See, e.g., Feng Fu, Martin A. Nowak, Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Evolution of
Homophily, 2 SCI. REP. 845 at 1 (2012) (examining how "[h]omophily, the tendency to interact with others of
similar type" evolved, its prevalence in nature, and a number of benefits (and limitations) it can produce).
199. See, e.g., Farmer & Maister, supra note 173, at 331 32 (citations omitted).
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enhance empathy for and understanding of the experience of those in the out-
group.200 In the context of virtual reality, researchers have focused on contexts
like age and race to investigate the impact of avatars on reducing the bias of in-
group members towards out-group members.20 1
Researchers suggest that "any social category that is salient during an interac-
tion may lead to in/out-group distinction,' 2 2 but that people perceive race as a
particularly powerful category signal. 2 3 Racial discrimination represents a com-
pelling harm in today's society. Consequently, a range of studies in the virtual
reality context focus on evaluating whether IVEs can reduce racial bias.204
Commonly, among the protocols, the study methodology includes the embodi-
ment of a light-skinned individual in a dark-skinned avatar body and vice versa.
Once inside the virtual domain, individuals engage with a virtual mirror in which
they perceive themselves as the avatar with a different skin tone.205 With the
administration of an Implicit Association Test (IAT) 206 or another metric,
researchers measure racial attitudes both before and after the IVE experience.
Results of these studies vary, 207 but a growing number suggest that IVEs can
effectively reduce racial bias for at least some period following the immersion.
For example, in a study published in 2016, Banakou and colleagues found "the
technique of virtual embodiment, where a light-skinned person's body is visually
substituted in immersive virtual reality by a life-sized spatially coincident dark-
skinned virtual body, results in a reduction in implicit bias that lasts at least 1
week. '208 In the Banakou study, participants engaged in the immersion experi-
ence for a five minute orientation to their virtual body followed by ten minutes of
participation in the experiment activity (a Tai Chi lesson) on one, two, or three
occasions, depending on their group.209 The researchers reported that implicit
200. See, e.g., supra note 167 and accompanying text.
201. See, e.g., Oh et al., supra note 17.
202. Hasler et al., supra note 182, at 2.
203. Id. at 2.
204. Id. at 1 2.
205. BAILENSON, supra note 20, at 84-85, 88 89.
206. See Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual
Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464
(1998).
207. See Hasler et al., supra note 182, at 2 (citing Peck et al., supra note 19; L. Maister, N. Sebanz, G.
Knoblich & M. Tsakiris, Experiencing Ownership Over a Dark-Skinned Body Reduces Implicit Racial Bias,
128 COGNITION 170 (2013); Banakou et al., supra note 18; H. Farmer, A. Tajadura-Jimenez & M. Tsakiris,
Beyond the Colour of My Skin: How Skin Colour Affects the Sense of Body-Ownership, 21 CONSCIOUSNESS &
COGNITION 1242 (2012)); GROOM ET AL., supra note 18.
208. Banakou et al., supranote 18, at 1.
209. Id. at 3. The researchers note that, from their first experiment, "the evidence for the influence of multi-
ple exposures is more ambiguous ... there may be some effect even if not statistically significant" and, with
respect to their second experiment, "that the Embodied Black condition does reduce implicit bias irrespective
of the number of exposures. However, there is also evidence that bias also decreases with the number of expo-
sures independently of the Embodiment factor." Id. at 7.
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bias decreased in each group, even in the group with only a single immersion
exposure.210
Recent work has also employed a metric beyond the IAT for measuring possi-
ble reduction in racial bias. In a study published in 2017, B6atrice Hasler and
colleagues evaluated the occurrence of mimicry by individuals embodied in
darker- and lighter-skinned avatars that were the opposite of their real-world
appearances. 211 The authors explain that previous research had demonstrated that
people mimic the behaviors of those within their perceived in-group to a much
greater extent than the behaviors of those in a perceived out-group.212 In Hasler's
experiment, following immersion by light-skinned individuals in dark-skinned
avatars and embodied interaction with another virtual character for one exposure
of six minutes, the researchers found that light-skinned individuals engaged in
mimicry more consistent with their virtual selves than with their real selves.21 3 As
the authors explain, "[I]n VR the skin color of participants' virtual body rather
than their real body influences who they mimic more. Since mimicry is a non-
conscious behavior that signifies social rapport this shows how actual behavior
may be impacted through such virtual embodiment, beyond what can be found
from implicit associations. 21 4
Not all IVE studies have reported a reduction in bias. 21 For example, in a study
published in 2009, in what the authors describe as "the first to use IVEs to exam-
ine the effects of racial perspective taking, '216 participants' racial bias did not
decrease.217 The authors explain that their experiment suggested that embodying
a person who is a member of a racial group that has been subject to societal race
discrimination did not reduce participants' "automatic racial bias[.] '21 1 The
researchers hypothesized that this may have been a function of stereotype activa-
tion, in which "[p]eople aware of stereotypes express implicit bias when stereo-
types are activated, regardless of their agreement with them. '219 In a subsequent
experiment, other researchers amended the experimental protocol and found that
"embodiment of light-skinned participants in a dark-skinned VB [virtual body]
210. Banakou et al., supranote 18, at 7.
211. Hasler et al., supra note 182, at 1 2.
212. Id. at 2.
213. Id. at 4, 12. In this study, researchers found "no change in implicit racial bias as measured by the IAT
simply as a result of the embodiment." Id. at 11. They note that "[tihis finding stands apart from all but one of
the previous experiments that have used multisensory integration to achieve embodiment of White participants
with a Black body (or body part in the case of the Rubber Hand Illusion)." Id. (citations omitted). The one pre-
vious experiment to which they refer is the Groom et al. experiment cited supra in note 18 and described infra
at notes 215 219 and accompanying text. Id. (citing GROOM ET AL., supra note 18).
214. Hasler et al., supra note 182, at 2.
215. See GROOM ET AL., supra note 18.
216. Id. at 3.
217. See id. at 14-16.
218. Id. at 14.
219. Id. (citation omitted). See also Farmer & Maister, supra note 173, at 343 for a discussion of the care
needed to avoid stereotype activation.
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significantly reduced implicit racial bias against dark-skinned people, in contrast
to embodiment in light-skinned, purple-skinned or with no VB."22o
More directly relevant to the legal context, in an IVE experiment conducted to
investigate racial bias and legal decision making, Natalie Salmanowitz hypothe-
sized that virtual reality could "induce potent effects ' 221 for reducing racial bias
"without increasing cognitive load. '222 Her first experiment sought "(1) to design
an extremely subtle VR paradigm, capable of impacting IAT scores without
increasing race salience, and (2) to determine if and how the VR experience influ-
",223ences legal decisions.
In addition to control groups for both the race condition and the virtual reality
condition, her experiment placed participants in avatars that displayed a race dif-
ferent than their own (Black/White) in a real or sham virtual reality condition. In
the sham condition, participants lacked an avatar and did not see a body attached
to the hand-held controllers.224 For this study, in addition to other non-VR tasks,
each participant engaged in a single exposure "five-minute virtual reality (VR)
paradigm. "225
Ms. Salmanowitz summarizes the results of the experiment as follows:
After embodying a black avatar in the virtual world, participants produced sig-
nificantly lower implicit racial bias scores than those who experienced a sham
version of the virtual reality paradigm. Additionally, these participants more
conservatively evaluated an ambiguous legal case, rating vague evidence as
less indicative of guilt and rendering more Not Guilty verdicts.
226
She also opines that "this result was achieved in a manner subtle enough for
the courtroom setting. "227 As two of the takeaways from this study, Ms.
Salmanowitz suggests that "embodying an outgroup avatar for five minutes can
220. Peck et al., supra note 19, at 779. The authors of this study suggest that there were several differences
in the experimental protocols between their study and the Groom et al. study, supra note 18, including the
length of the embodiment and the task that was assigned in the Groom et al. study. The researchers in the Peck
et al. study "hypothesize that the increase in implicit racial bias scores found in the study of Groom et al. (2009)
was due not to embodiment, but to the pre-exposure of being placed into a situation that is known for race dis-
crimination. In [the Peck et al.] study the participants were given no task at all, except for the 5 min of observ-
ing their environment and virtual body, both directly by looking towards their body and in a mirror, and then
watching the 12 virtual characters walk by." Peck et al., supra note 19, at 785.
221. Salmanowitz, Impact of Virtual Reality, supra note 26, at 181.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 182.
224. Id. at 184 ("[T]hose in the Sham condition experienced the virtual world without any connection to a
physical body.").
225. Id. at 176.
226. Id. at 174. As a summative assessment of the first experiment, Ms. Salmanowitz explains that "the
results suggest a generally positive impact of the VR paradigm on both implicit racial bias and legal decisions."
Id. at 195.
227. Id. at 194. For an article that outlined a virtual reality approach to reducing racial bias in the courtroom
in anticipation of Ms. Salmanowitz's actual experiment, see Salmanowitz, Unconventional Methods, supra
note 26.
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have a positive impact on implicit racial biases, [and] this experience can result
in more cautious legal judgments in light of ambiguous evidence."228
2. RESEARCH ON AVATARS, COGNITIVE BIAS, AGE, DISABILITY, AND HOMELESSNESS
Successful reductions of bias in contexts other than race also appear in the IVE
scholarly literature. In a study, for example, on discrimination based on age (age-
ism), researchers explored whether perspective taking, using both traditional
mental simulation (MS) approaches and immersive virtual environments (IVEs),
reduced ageism in the young participants in the study.229 The researchers con-
cluded that, although results varied depending on specific factors in the experi-
mental design,230 their "study offers evidence that IVEs can yield greater benefits
than MS for people who are in situations that make it difficult for them to take the
perspective of an outgroup member.
231
Similarly, research on IVEs and colorblindness supports the power of IVEs
over more static types of perspective-taking experiences in changing people's
behaviors.232 The researchers aimed to
foster greater self-other merging with persons with disabilities; increase favor-
able attitude[s] toward them; and assess whether the influence of these experi-
ences could transfer to the physical world, leading to actual helping behavior.
These effects were compared against traditional perspective taking methods
that rely on imagination to assess the strengths and weaknesses of embodied
experiences through IVET.233
The researchers found, for example, that in the third experiment "participants
in the EE [Embodied Environment] condition demonstrated twice as much help-
ing behavior compared to participants in the PT [traditional perspective-taking]
condition. '234 The study authors note that "[r]egardless of best efforts to put
themselves in the situation, people generally have a difficult time fully
228. Salmanowitz, Impact of Virtual Reality, supra note 26, at 199 200.
229. Oh et al., supra note 17; see also Domna Banakou, Sameer Kishore & Mel Slater, Virtually Being
Einstein Results in an Improvement in Cognitive Task Performance and a Decrease in Age Bias, 9 FRONTIERS
PSYCHOL. 1, 9 (2018) (reporting that "embodiment of young adults in the older Einstein body led to a reduction
of implicit bias against elderly, resulting in overall lower IAT scores compared to the control condition
(Normal body)").
230. Oh et al., supra note 17, at 406 07. These studies sometimes explore the impact on bias within the con-
text of a threat that the in-group perceives as posed by the out-group. For example, in the ageism study dis-
cussed here, researchers invoked the concern that our aging population will impose financial burdens on
today's youth. See id. at 407 08. The researchers noted that "when the level of intergroup threat is direct and
concrete, increasing the level of immersion alone is not enough to overcome low levels of motivation to empa-
thize with outgroup members." Oh et al., supra note 17, at 407.
231. Id. at 407.
232. See Ahn et al., supra note 19.
233. Id. at 8.
234. Id. at 31.
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appreciating the true nuances of the situation unless they are living the situation
in that moment.
235
Recent research extends the evaluation of the impact of avatars on attitudes
and behavior to their impact on attitudes and behavior toward people who are
homeless. 6 In the first of the two studies, researchers compared an IVE experi-
ence in which the participant's avatar became homeless with a more traditional
imagine-yourself-becoming-homeless non-IVE experience 7.23 This study pursued
a longitudinal approach tracking various metrics over an eight-week period.238
Although, on some scales, participants in both the IVE and the traditional condi-
239tion demonstrated relative parity, researchers reported that the IVE virtual real-
ity condition "did result in more positive, longer-lasting attitudes toward the
homeless and significantly more signatures supporting helpful initiatives [for
homeless individuals] than did the NPT [traditional narrative-based perspective-
taking] condition. '240 This study provides valuable insight into the potential dura-
tion of the effects of an IVE experience on attitudes, suggesting that effects can
persist for at least eight weeks and be more robust than a traditional perspective-
taking approach.241
In the second study, which was not longitudinal, the researchers compared four
conditions aimed at increasing empathy for the homeless: an information condi-
tion in which participants were "solely provided facts about the homeless popula-
tion' ";242 a traditional non-IVE imagine-yourself-becoming-homeless experience;
a 2D interactive narrative of becoming homeless on a computer; and the IVE ex-
perience of becoming homeless. As in the first study described above, on one or
more scales, participants in various non-IVE conditions demonstrated relative
parity with participants in the IVE condition.243 Interestingly, as measured by the
proportion of people who signed the petition supporting an initiative helpful to
homeless individuals, researchers reported that "there was no significant differ-
ence between the Information condition and the VRPT [IVE] condition in the
proportion of people who signed the petition[,] '244 although researchers did
235. Id. at 10. But see Herrera, supra note 18, at 3-4, for a discussion of other studies on disability, stereo-
types, and empathy using non-IVE simulations and finding varied results, some increasing empathy but some
reinforcing stereotypes and/or augmenting negative attitudes.
236. Herrera et al., supra note 18.
237. Id. at 5.
238. Id. at5 8.
239. Id. at 18 19.
240. Id. at 20-21.
241. As is the case for research more generally, the researchers here noted several cautions and limitations,
including, inter alia, that "attitudes toward the homeless were not measured before the intervention," and that it
will be important to control for user experience level as virtual empathy experiences become more common.
Id. at 31 32. For a discussion of earlier VR studies and the persistence or lack of persistence of effects over
time, see id. at 5.
242. Id. at 27.
243. Id. at 27 28.
244. Id. at 27.
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report that the information condition "was less effective at making participants
feel empathetic and connected to the homeless than any of the perspective-taking
conditions. '245 Researchers also reported that, with respect to the IVE experience,
as compared to the other two perspective-taking conditions, "[t]he immersive ex-
perience of becoming homeless in an IVE resulted in a significantly higher pro-
portion of participants exhibiting helpful behaviors toward the homeless in the
form of signing a petition when compared to traditional and less immersive per-
spective-taking tasks. ' 246 The results of these studies on empathy and homeless-
ness extend earlier research suggesting that IVEs are generally a more powerful
medium than traditional perspective taking for changing behavior. These studies
also suggest that, in designing research testing an IVE condition, it will be valua-
ble to include information and control conditions for comparison purposes.247
B. RESEARCH ON AVATARS TO CHANGE BEHAVIOR IN ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION AND EXERCISE
In addition to research specifically on cognitive bias and avatars in the contexts
of race, age, disability, and homelessness, empirical studies focus, inter alia, on
the potency of IVE to modify perspective and behavior more generally in other
domains. 248 This subsection considers studies on environmental conservation and
on exercise that produced positive behavioral effects.
In a pair of experiments, researchers gauged whether an IVE experience would
produce a greater impact on environmental conservation than would a traditional
education presentation in print and video formats. 249 The experiments focused on
providing personal experiences of negative environmental consequences to per-
suade people that their own behaviors directly impact the health of the environ-
ment.250 In the first experiment, the researchers used print materials about
deforestation and the virtual reality experience of the participant sawing through
the trunk of a tree in a forest to provide the experience.2 1 In the print condition of
the first experiment, "participants were asked to create a vivid picture in their
minds about what they might see, hear, and feel in the forest while reading the
detailed print stimulus ... that depicted the forest, the tree-cutting process, and
the silent forest after the tree fell down." 25 2 Those who participated in the IVE ex-
perience held the power saw and cut down the tree in the forest.253 In this example
245. Id.
246. Id. at 28.
247. Herrera et al. also note the value of including a "pure control condition" in future studies. Id. at 31.
248. See also, e.g., supra note 195.
249. Sun Joo (Grace) Aln, Jeremy N. Bailenson & Dooyeon Park, Short- and Long-Term Effects of
Embodied Experiences in Immersive Virtual Environments on Environmental Locus of Control and Behavior,
39 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 235 (2014).
250. Id. at 235.
251. See id. at 237.
252. Id. at 238.
253. See id. at 237 38.
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of the potential of IVE to affect behavior, the researchers reported that "the perso-
nal experience of a future negative consequence-cutting a virtual tree-was suf-
ficiently powerful to encourage individuals to use approximately 20% fewer
paper napkins in the physical world compared to individuals who merely read a
description about cutting a tree. "254
In the second experiment of the pair, the researchers added a third condition to
the print and IVE experiences. In the third condition, in lieu of imagining the for-
est or experiencing the virtual forest, participants saw a video of the tree-cutting
process from the perspective of a camera affixed to a lumberjack who was
actually cutting down the tree, providing a first-person perspective with the video
displayed on a desktop monitor.2 5 The researchers found that "[t]he effect of
print and video on environmental locus of control and behavior declined over the
course of one week whereas the effects of IVEs persisted relatively strongly."
256
This research again suggests that avatars may be more powerful as agents of be-
havioral change than other less immersive approaches.
Similarly, research on avatars and exercise also suggests that IVEs can be used
to encourage desired behavior. "Social cognitive theory describes the power of a
model demonstrating a behavior to encourage modeling by an observer. "257
Moreover, when the subject identifies with the model, research suggests that the
subject's propensity to engage in the modeled behavior increases. 2 8 Applied in
the IVE context, using digital photographs and other technology, researchers cre-
ated avatars that looked like each subject.25 9 In a series of three experiments, the
researchers tested whether the subjects who observed avatars that resembled
themselves were likely to engage in more exercise than those who observed ava-
tars that did not.260 The researchers "found that simulating positive health results
through an avatar similar in appearance to the user increased healthy exercise
behaviors over time. '26 1 Modeling in an immersive virtual environment that pro-
duces desired behavioral change offers additional possibilities for diminishing
error in the Brady context.
Research on using digital avatars thus suggests that, in a properly designed ex-
perience, these potent immersion opportunities commonly reduced bias and
changed participants' real-world behavior. Moreover, the research above
254. Id. at 239.
255. See id. at 240.
256. Id. at 241-42.
257. Jesse Fox & Jeremy N. Bailenson, Virtual Self-Modeling: The Effects of Vicarious Reinforcement and
Identification on Exercise Behaviors, 12 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2009) (first citing ALBERT BANDURA, SOCIAL
LEARNING THEORY (1977); and then citing Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory of Mass Communication,
3 MEDIA PSYCHOL. 265 (2001)).
258. Fox & Bailenson, supra note 257, at 3 (citations omitted).
259. Id. at 6.
260. Id. at 17. In general, as in other studies, the researchers also note various limitations and caveats. Id. at
19 20.
261. Scarborough & Bailenson, supra note 22, at 136.
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provides evidence that, as a rule, the embodied experience affected participants'
behavior to a significantly greater degree than did more traditional perspective-
taking approaches.
V. AVATARS AND BRADY EVALUATIONS
The U.S. criminal justice system entrusts prosecutors with dual roles, first as
seekers of justice and second as advocates. A significant challenge to successfully
fulfilling both involves the sometimes contradictory expectations at their intersec-
tion. As we learn more about cognitive processes and bias, the challenge, to the
extent that prosecutors remain entrusted with both roles, becomes preventing the
role of advocate from detrimentally overshadowing the role of justice seeker.
Avatars might assist prosecutors to adjust the balance between their two roles in a
way that better enables them to perform both successfully.
How might avatars assist prosecutors in making better decisions in the context
of Brady? At least two types of possibilities surface. First, if an immersive virtual
experience could disrupt or modify the Guilt Perspective such that the perspective
were not deeply (or as deeply) entrenched, then that might reduce or preempt an
ensuing cascade of cognitive biases, like confirmation bias and belief persever-
ance. Second, virtual reality might function to positively encourage and reinforce
prosecutorial decision making that complies with Brady.
Much of the experimental research described above on bias and virtual reality
involves a participant embodying an avatar to enable the participant to experience
the world through specific characteristics of that avatar. The research suggests
that this embodiment might enhance self-other overlap and empathy regarding
individuals who possess those characteristics. As a result, the participant may har-
bor lower levels of subsequent explicit or implicit bias towards a real human
being who manifests those characteristics.
To fulfill the dual roles required of a genuinely successful prosecutor, a prose-
cutor has to concurrently hold two potentially inconsistent theories about the de-
fendant in mind: that the defendant is likely guilty (otherwise charges would not
have been filed) but may still be innocent (or at least that there may not be
adequate admissible evidence to prove guilt). The prosecutor needs to maintain
these mental gymnastics throughout the prosecution. A primary impediment to
Brady disclosure is the personal and office Guilt Perspective or tunnel vision that
often develops within the minds of prosecutors and in prosecutors' offices.
Prosecutors spend their in-office time with individuals who generally believe that
defendants, those who have been charged with crime, are guilty. They spend their
in-court time largely advocating in furtherance of and consistent with a Guilt
Perspective. Compounding the challenge of an environment that promotes and
endorses a Guilt Perspective, it is a fair assumption that most prosecutors have
never been charged with serious criminal behavior. As a criminal background
investigation is generally a prerequisite to being hired as a prosecutor, it is a
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reasonable assumption that few prosecutors are hired who have been charged
with or convicted of serious crimes.262 Thus, the prosecutor has likely never per-
sonally been in the seat of the accused.
In addition, prosecutors usually lack any opportunity to engage with the
accused, except when formally appearing as the advocate against the accused in a
courtroom. As a rule, except for statements taken by law enforcement from the
accused, the prosecutor will never hear an accused's account of the events unless
the accused testifies in court, which happens in a very small percentage of
cases. 263 Prosecutors often, therefore, lack a fundamental narrative, uninfluenced
by police interrogation, in most case histories.
The in-group for prosecutors embraces their colleagues and the law enforce-
ment officers with whom they work.264 One might even extend the in-group to
victims of the charged crimes. Imagining oneself as a crime victim probably falls
well within the realm of imagining for a prosecutor. This in-group definition pre-
dicts the likely composition of the out-group for prosecutors, namely defendants
and perhaps defense attorneys, even though they share the same professional
calling.
The theory of a first approach to using avatars would be to create an experiment
designed to dislodge the hold of the Guilt Perspective. Based on the embodied
perspective-taking research above, the experiment would involve perspective tak-
ing focused on generating self-other overlap and empathy by the prosecutor for
persons accused of criminal conduct. Such an experiment might include the pros-
ecutor actually becoming a defendant and being treated as a defendant in the vir-
tual space. The avatar could be dressed in a jail-issued orange jumpsuit, just as
defendants commonly are in court.265 Measuring whether the avatar experience
successfully reduces bias might involve asking participants to complete pre- and
post-immersion Brady compliance tasks. Non-VR empirical research in the con-
text of Brady has employed Brady compliance tasks as a metric of prosecutorial
error. 2 66 For example, to measure whether study participants engaged in Brady
error in their role as prosecutors, researchers in a recent study assessed how many
of the Brady-designated discovery items the participants provided in disclosure
to the defense in the mock case task.267 Perhaps a version of such protocols could
262. Prosecutors may, of course, have family members and friends who have been accused of or convicted
of serious crimes.
263. Most cases settle in lieu of proceeding to trial, leaving limited opportunities for defendants to tell their
account of events in court. See, e.g., Criminal Cases, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-
courts/types-cases/criminal-cases [https://perma.cc/3WCG-CBLH] ("More than 90 percent of defendants plead
guilty rather than go to trial.").
264. For a discussion of in-group and out-group dynamics in the context of criminal investigations and pros-
ecutorial decision-making, see SIMON, supra note 14, at 28 29.
265. Interview with Professor Emily Murphy, Associate Professor of Law, UC Hastings College of the Law
(Winter 2018). The design would also need to be attentive to potential stereotype activation concerns.
266. See REDLICH & LUNA, supra note 162.
267. See id.
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be employed here. Based on the results of the research discussed earlier, this ex-
perience could allow prosecutors to engage with the world, at least briefly, as
defendants in a deeply immersive experience, and potentially loosen the grip of
the Guilt Perspective.20 8
A second application of immersive virtual environments could involve a more
direct function of encouraging and supporting prosecutors in appropriately dis-
closing Brady information. Studies like that of the Fox and Bailenson exercise
experiment suggest that avatar experiences could encourage and virtually reward
prosecutors for proper Brady disclosure. Here, the avatar experience would
engage the prosecutor in an avatar that resembles that prosecutor and provide pos-
itive reinforcement for disclosing under Brady. Although the design of such an
experiment, like the one of the prosecutor as the defendant above, requires an
investment of much more thought (and consultation with scholars in the field),
one could imagine the avatar being recognized at prosecutorial state-wide or
national conferences for Brady compliance, or for preventing prosecution of per-
sons who are factually innocent.
Other variations of immersive experiences spring to mind as possibilities. For
example, in addition to or in lieu of a prosecutor in an embodied experience as a
defendant, one could create such an experience with the prosecutor as defense
counsel fighting for a client who has been wrongfully convicted due to Brady
error.269 1 imagine those who research in the virtual reality world could envision a
host of additional variations to address the concerns underlying Brady error.
VI. POTENTIAL BENEFITS & DRAWBACKS TO DIGITAL AVATARS IN THE
BRADY CONTEXT
Applying a digital avatar approach to preventing Brady violations is novel.
Consequently, it merits thoughtful evaluation of its most cogent potential benefits
and drawbacks.
268. Professor Jeremy Bailenson, who is the founding director of the Virtual Human Interaction Lab at
Stanford University, argues that immersive virtual environment experiences should be reserved and used only
if at least one of four conditions is met. BAILENSON, supra note 20, at 250 53. These conditions are that the ex-
perience would be "impossible, dangerous, expensive, or counterproductive" in the real world. Id. at 253.
Becoming a defendant in a serious real-world criminal case arguably satisfies at least the counterproductive, if
not the dangerous, criterion.
269. In commenting on an earlier version of this manuscript, Professor Leonetti suggested a possible varia-
tion involving a prosecutor's avatar having a "negative encounter with a police officer during a Terry stop or
arrest." Carrie Leonetti, Feedback on Manuscript March 16th Version (on file with author). More generally, as
suggested by Ms. Salmanowitz in her commentary on a June 2018 draft, one might extend the possibilities of
the VR paradigm by focusing on issues of framing and belief perseverance through an initial embodied experi-
ence that then is changed to place the prosecutor in the same scenario but through another or opposite lens.
Here, the VR experience would aim to address flexibility of thinking and recognition of pre-existing assump-
tions. E-mail from Natalie Salmanowitz to author (July 3, 2018, 8:57 PM) (on file with author).
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A. BENEFITS
Avatars are potent and can be effective agents of behavioral change.270 The
research demonstrates that avatars can affect the behavior of participants not only
during the experiment but also in the real world subsequent to the experiment.271
In the context of racial bias, age discrimination, discrimination against colorblind
individuals and against people who are homeless, environmental conservation,
and exercise, as the above examples indicate, immersive virtual environments
have created behavioral change.272 Depending on the design of the experiment,
however, not all of the studies show the change hypothesized or anticipated by
the experimenter. 273 This variation suggests that it may take multiple iterations
and experiments to design an effective protocol to disrupt a prosecutor's Guilt
Perspective appropriately. Moreover, any protocol would, of course, need careful
experimental validation before deployment. But, based on research in the field,
the potential to create effective self-other overlap and empathy towards an
accused lies within the immersive virtual world. Using virtual space to enable a
prosecutor to become a defendant may help mitigate or truncate the perception of
the defendant as an "out-group" member and reduce the cognitive biases that
could cloud prosecutorial Brady evaluations, thus encouraging prosecutors to rec-
ognize evidence as favorable to the accused and to disclose it.
In addition, not only has the research demonstrated that avatars can effect
change, but the research also suggests that avatars are significantly more effective
at inducing change than are traditional perspective-taking approaches. 274 Avatars
also appear to impose less cognitive load than the load imposed by imagining
being in the proverbial shoes of another. The research suggests that "[b]ecause
they offer a more tangible experience, perspective taking in an immersive virtual
environment (IVE) may require less cognitive effort than traditional perspective
taking exercises that rely on mental simulation." 2
7
Avatars focus on modifying the perspective of those individuals directly re-
sponsible for making the Brady call. While external reinforcement may be help-
ful, in the end, it is most often the prosecutor handling the case who will be in the
position to decide whether to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, particu-
larly evidence that might not be well documented. It is the prosecutor handling
the case who will need to make the call, often under time constraints and other
pressures, about whether evidence meets the Brady threshold. Affecting that
prosecutor's understanding and inclination to disclose is ground zero in terms of
Brady compliance. Because it is that prosecutor's perspective that an avatar could
270. See supra notes 189 261 and accompanying text.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., GROOM ET AL., supra note 18.
274. See Ahn et al., supra note 19, at 31.
275. Oh et al., supra note 17, at 400 (citation omitted).
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change, avatars could play a pivotal role in this first line of defense against Brady
error.
Moreover, beyond Brady, state ethics rules commonly demand that prosecutors
"shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant ... the existence of
evidence or information known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or
reduce the sentence, except when relieved of this responsibility by a protective
order of a tribunal. '276 State rules, like the New York rule quoted here, generally
do not anticipate any materiality buffer, thus arguably heightening the importance
of the prosecutor's ability to recognize evidence as favorable to the accused and
to disclose it.
In addition to effectiveness, the avatar experience generally contemplates a
single immersion session of less than twenty minutes. This could be incorporated
into continuing legal education opportunities for experienced prosecutors locally
and at state and national conferences and in new prosecutors' training conferen-
ces for those just joining the field. Most of the existing approaches recommended
to address Brady error attributed to cognitive bias involve much more extensive
time commitments. Even if several avatar sessions were required,277 a question
that might be studied as part of the design protocol, the total time involved for a
prosecutor would be limited. If such immersion makes it easier for a prosecutor
to accurately evaluate whether to disclose evidence, that, in and of itself, could
represent a more expedient decision and time saved.
A virtual experience also offers a safer environment for trying on other roles.
Switching to a defense role contemplates a significant change in mindset for a
prosecutor and presumably incurs some mental juggling and a learning curve.
Implementing such a switch in the real world with actual defendants is more
likely to disadvantage clients as prosecutors shift between perspectives and
approaches. Engaging in the avatar experience does not subject real-world
defendants to those risks.
The avatar experience is engaging and memorable. Virtual reality experiences
are unlike standard lecture training sessions. Their novelty and immersive quality
may incline prosecutors toward participation.
Avatars are a potentially mobile and cost-effective approach. Recent research
by Professor Bailenson's team involves an IVE designed to test empathy induc-
tion toward homeless individuals. 278 He characterizes this as the "'Empathy at
Scale' project. ' 279 Bailenson explains that his team has "installed VR systems on
the road-our Mobile VR Unit-in museums, near libraries, and at festivals and
276. N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (2018).
277. For research that considered whether multiple immersions were significant in the context of using ava-
tars to reduce racial bias, see Banakou et al., supra note 18, at 3, 7.
278. Herrera et al., supra note 18.
279. BAILENSON, supra note 20, at 97 99.
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fairs to try to get people who are not just the typical college students. 28 ° He
reports that "[a]s of September 2017, [they had] data from over 2,000 sub-
jects. '211 Consequently, reaching large numbers of prosecutors at various sites
around the country does not seem farfetched.28 2
Moreover, in terms of hardware costs, Ms. Salmanowitz's experiment used the
HTC Vive technology, which, by the summer of 2018, listed on Amazon for
$499 per VR system.28 3 In addition to a headset and controllers, the experience
would also need a powerful graphics computer to run the software, a computer
that might cost up to several thousand dollars, as well as some floor space. With
respect to software, there may be substantial initial programming costs to design
the experience, but VR software design platforms are becoming more user
friendly and accessible.2 4 One such platform, NeuroVR, advertises "a cost-free
virtual reality platform based on open-source software, that [provides] the clinical
professional with a cost-free VE editor, which allows non-expert users to easily
modify a virtual scene, to best suit the needs of the clinical setting. ' 25 In any
event, once designed, the cost of deploying the experience should be fairly mod-
est per prosecutor because the immersive experience should consume twenty
minutes or less. Thus, one hardware station could be used by many prosecutors
per day. Of course, there is also the cost of each prosecutor's time. Prosecutors,
however, are expected to invest time in professional training, and such a session
could count toward that training. With the improvement and accessibility of tech-
nology today,28 6 the immersive program could be made available at sites, like
state or national prosecutorial conferences, where many prosecutors could engage
with digital avatars. Engaging at a professional conference could also work to
prompt discussion and to improve volitional focus on the importance of
disclosure.
280. Id. at 97.
281. Id.
282. Cf. Soo Youn Oh, Ketaki Shriram, Bireswar Laha, Shawnee Baughman, Elise Ogle & Jeremy
Bailenson, Immersion at Scale: Researcher's Guide to Ecologically Valid Mobile Experiments, Conference
Proceedings of IEEE Virtual Reality (VR) (Mar. 19 23, 2016), https://vhil.stanford.edu/mm/2016/01/oh-vr-
immersion-at-scale.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK7C-ASJR] (discussing their "mobile VR project (Immersion at
Scale) where [they] conduct VR experiment sessions in naturalistic settings (e.g., local events, museums, etc.)"
noting that "on average, [they] were able to collect data from 20-25 people for each 4-hour data collection
session of Immersion at Scale").
283. HTC Vive Virtual Reality System, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/HTC-VIVE-Virtual-Reality-
System-pc/dp/B00VF5NT4I?th=l [https://perma.cc/CV44-XXB7]. For a discussion of costs for different types
of systems, see TICKNOR, VIRTUAL REALITY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 195, at 9 17.
284. See Ticknor & Tillinghast, supra note 195, at 29 (discussing NeuroVR and InWorld Solutions, Inc.);
TICKNOR, VIRTUAL REALITY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, supra note 195, at 16 17.
285. NEUROVR 2.0, http://www.neurovr2.org/[https://perma.cc/J8XC-FJA3].
286. See Farmer & Maister, supra note 173, at 341 (describing the availability of "several commercial VR
systems such as the Oculus Rift, the HTC Vive and the Samsung Gear which are capable of supporting the
visual-motor synchrony necessary to allow the experience of embodiment").
THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS
The potential benefits extend beyond Brady. Increased self-other overlap and
empathy can serve prosecutors more generally in their justice seeking role and
navigating their dual roles within constitutional parameters.2 87
B. DRAWBACKS
While engaging with a digital avatar has myriad potential benefits, it also pos-
sesses potential limitations.
First and foremost, an avatar experience might indeed make a prosecutor more
empathetic and delay or reduce the entrenchment of a Guilt Perspective. Will that
altered perspective mean that prosecutors will lose effectiveness as advocates?
When discussing qualities associated with a Guilt Perspective, commentators of-
ten quote Herbert Packer's observation that "the operational 'presumption of
guilt' ... allows the fast-paced case screening process in most district attorneys'
offices to function. '288 Would greater empathy and a less entrenched Guilt
Perspective bring evaluations to a halt? To the extent that many prosecutors in
cases nationwide fulfill the demands of Brady on a regular basis, and the impor-
tant business of charging and prosecuting cases has not ceased or become appre-
ciably more constrained by their efforts, it is likely that greater empathy and a
less rooted Guilt Perspective will not prevent prosecutors from advocating for
guilt when that advocacy is appropriate.289
One might even argue that greater empathy may make the process less cumber-
some. When the motivation to comply stems from internal understanding of the
need to comply, compliance may become more automatic and demand less cogni-
tive effort. Still, it is possible that a more empathetic perspective would result in
more agonizing by prosecutors about charging and whether they are providing
the requisite discovery. This greater empathy might cause prosecutors to screen
differently or more carefully, but such greater care might not result in more time
consumption in the long run because less meritorious cases may be screened out
earlier. Moreover, in those difficult cases, prosecutors might heed the U.S.
Supreme Court's caution to err on the side of disclosure. In addition, in terms of
time savings, pre-trial disclosure can save time spent on protracted litigation sub-
sequent to trial and engender appropriate negotiated settlements, not to mention
saving the critical human costs of detrimental failure to disclose.
287. For example, enhancing self-other overlap and empathy might incline prosecutors to support altema-
tive approaches tojustice, like problem-solving courts and restorative justice.
288. Burke, Improving, supra note 7, at 1621 (footnote omitted); see also supra note 82.
289. Professor Murphy raised another potential drawback. What if the IVE experience is highly effective in
the Brady context on a case-by-case basis? Could it provide grounds for a post-conviction Brady claim against
a prosecutor who failed to appropriately disclose and failed to participate in an IVE experience before handling
that case? Emily Murphy, Feedback on Manuscript July 16th Version (on file with author). Or, to extend
Professor Murphy's inquiry: could an office's failure to provide such experiences on a regular basis fumish
grounds for a claim for failure to appropriately train prosecutors on their responsibilities under Brady?
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A second potential drawback lies in the potency of the immersive experience
itself. Manipulation of people's perspectives involves risk. The potential for mis-
use is substantial. Research tells us that fully immersive experiences can have
powerful impacts on people's behavior. The Stanford Prison Experiment offers
an important and troubling example. In that experiment, the researchers created
an artificial environment in which ordinary undergraduate students played the
roles of prison guards and prisoners. 290 According to the researchers, the students
became so captured by their roles that the experimenters had to call off the
experiment only six days into the anticipated two-week process. 291 The possibil-
ity that becoming a virtual defendant could induce some trauma in prosecutors
should be considered, and, if such trauma turns out to be a realistic possibility,
mitigating and remedial procedures should also be explored.292
In addition, a virtual reality immersion could encourage individuals to suspend
their real-world morality or have a virtual reality amorality carry over into the
real world. Consider, for example, concerns about first-person shooter games and
their influence on players.29 3
290. Social Psychology Network, The Story: An Overview of the Experiment, STANFORD PRISON
EXPERIMENT, http://www.prisonexp.org/the-story [https://perma.cc/JGT5-39ML].
291. Social Psychology Network, Conclusion, STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT, http://www.prisonexp.org/
conclusion [https://perma.cc/B2WE-YLR8]. The Stanford Prison Experiment has been the subject of
substantial recent criticism. For examples of those critiques and a response by Professor Zimbardo, who
conducted the experiment, see, for example, Ben Blum, The Lifespan of a Lie, MEDIUM (June 7, 2018), https://
medium.com/s/trustissues/the-lifespan-of-a-lie-d869212blf62 [https://perma.cc/67RD-4TPX]; Brian Resnick,
The Stanford Prison Experiment Was Massively Influential. We Just Learned it Was a Fraud., Vox (June 13,
2018), https://www.vox.com/platform/amp/2018/6/13/17449118/stanford-prison-experiment-fraud-psychology-
replication [https://perma.cc/EP5M-U6FV]; Phillip Zimbardo, Phillip Zimbardo's Response to Recent Critiques
of the Stanford Prison Experiment, STANFORD PRISON EXPERIMENT, http://www.prisonexp.org/response/ [https://
perma.cc/Y8JF-VCFW].
292. Empathy can cause personal distress. See, e.g., Herrera et al., supra note 18, at 11 (using a personal dis-
tress scale in evaluating empathy for the homeless). Existing scholarship does explore the concept of secondary
or vicarious trauma generally for attorneys, including prosecutors and defense counsel who work with trauma-
tized witnesses and clients. See, e.g., Brittany Stringfellow Otey, Buffering Burnout: Preparing the Online
Generation for the Occupational Hazards of the Profession, 24 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 147 (2014); Evan R.
Seamone, Sex Crimes Litigation as Hazardous Duty: Practical Tools for Trauma-Exposed Prosecutors,
Defense Counsel, and Paralegals, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2014).
293. The effects of violent video games have been the subject of substantial scholarly attention and pro-
duced conflicting results. Jop de Vrieze, The Metawars, 361 SCIENCE 1184 (2018). Compare AM. PSYCHOL.
ASS'N, TECHNICAL REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF VIOLENT VIDEO GAME LITERATURE 6, 11 (2015), http://www.
apa.org/pi/families/review-video-games.pdf [https://perma.cc/WHS7-9BK5] ("The link between violent video
game exposure and aggressive behavior is one of the most studied and well established" and "[t]he research
demonstrates a consistent relation between violent video game use and increases in aggressive behavior,
aggressive cognitions, and aggressive affect and decreases in prosocial behavior, empathy, and sensitivity to
aggression"), and Craig A. Anderson & Brad J. Bushman, Effect of Violent Video Games on Aggressive
Behavior, Aggressive Cognition, Aggressive Affect, Physiological Arousal, and Prosocial Behavior: A Meta-
Analytic Review of the Scientific Literature, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 353, 358 (2001) ("Exposure is positively
associated with heightened levels of aggression in young adults and children, in experimental and
nonexperimental designs, and in males and females."), with Christopher John Ferguson, The Good, The Bad
and the Ugly: A Meta-Analytic Review of Positive and Negative Effects of Violent Video Games, 78
PSYCHIATRIC Q. 309, 314 (2007) ("[T]hese results suggest that violent video game exposure is associated with
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Consequently, the type of virtual reality experience proposed here, while not
invoking the concerns of the prison environment or first-person shooters, would
still need careful attention to design and debriefing of participants. Scholars in the
field of virtual reality explain, for example, that "[n]o experiment should be con-
ducted using virtual reality with the foreseeable consequence that it will cause se-
rious or lasting harm to a subject. ' 294 Or, "virtual reality research should be
performed in a beneficent research environment, with the aim of mitigating risks
for users of virtual reality. '295 Such research would be subject to review through
an Institutional Review Board (IRB) process.
A third potential drawback inquires whether the cognitive bias that may cas-
cade from an entrenched Guilt Perspective is substantially different from the
biases that the IVE research thus far has investigated. It may be that the racial or
age biases, for example, are different from the confirmation and related informa-
tion distorting biases that the Brady research would aim to reduce. The question
then becomes whether the existing research would apply to the Brady context. To
the extent that the goal of the Brady research involves empathy and self-other
overlap from an in-group member (prosecutor) toward an out-group member (de-
fendant), the focus on dislodging or modifying the in-group bias is quite similar
to the approach of much of the existing research. If the experimental protocol suc-
cessfully creates prosecutorial empathy (for defendants) and self-other overlap,
the perspective-taking research suggests a likely reduction in the biases that
might otherwise ensue. Thus, the general approach should apply to the in-group,
out-group dynamic in the proposed research. Of course, in the end, we will need
to conduct the research to see whether the theory is borne out in practice.
Immersive virtual reality has become much more accessible, with the commer-
cial production of tools like the Oculus Rift, HTC Vive, and the Samsung Gear.2 96
Researchers have, therefore, expressed concern that "IVEs may lose their power
once they become an everyday experience. '297 This fourth drawback may under-
mine future research with IVEs. To the extent, however, that prosecutors have not
yet become regular participants in those experiences, there remains a window
before that concern undermines the possibility of effective IVE intervention.
A fifth potential drawback involves the duration of the modified behavior. Will
the enhanced empathy and changed behaviors last? While some research indi-
cates that effects do endure for at least some period of time beyond the initial ex-
perience, 29 8 more research on this question will be valuable. Similarly, although
some positive effects, but does not appear to be associated with negative effects in relation to aggressive
behavior.").
294. Parsons et al., supra note 18, at 13 (citation omitted).
295. Id.
296. See Farmer & Maister, supra note 173, at 341.
297. Oh et al., supra note 17, at 407.
298. Farmer & Maister, supra note 173, at 342; Herrera et al., supra note 18, at 19 (measuring impact
through study period of two months post-immersion).
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single session immersion has been effective in a number of studies on avatars to
reduce cognitive bias,299 it would be valuable to test whether a single session will
be sufficient or whether multiple sessions would be necessary or enhance the
anticipated effects in the Brady context.300 Designing and implementing experi-
ments in the proposed research that test the duration of effects and the appropriate
number of sessions could help provide more definitive responses on these issues.
Sixth, specifically with respect to a virtual reality experience in which a prose-
cutor is rewarded for effective Brady compliance, will such an experience be dis-
cordant with the lived reality of prosecutors? From her survey, Professor
Yaroshefsky noted that "[n] one of the offices we interviewed have mechanisms
in place to reward good disclosure practices and some have a culture that affirma-
tively discourages good disclosure practices."301 Would experiencing such a vir-
tual world make prosecutors feel disconnected from the real one? Here is an
opportunity for life to imitate art. Having supervisors and administrative person-
nel who make office policy personally participate in the IVE opportunity might
encourage greater real-world recognition of prosecutors who fulfill Brady's and
state ethics rules' dictates.
30 2
Seventh, some commentators may be concerned that the immersive virtual ex-
perience might just make the prosecutor a better chess player, anticipating the
moves of defense counsel. While this is possible, it seems unlikely that an experi-
ence focused on inducing empathy and self-other overlap would promote such
Machiavellian strategies.30 3
Eighth, for some individuals, engaging with virtual reality equipment can cause
uncomfortable physical symptoms, like motion sickness or eye strain.3" Hence,
the design of the protocol should seek to evaluate and mitigate these effects.
Finally, will prosecutors be willing to engage? That will depend first on dem-
onstrating the worth of the experience. If the anticipated research suggests that an
immersive virtual experience can appropriately enable prosecutors to more effec-
tively navigate their dual roles in the context of Brady compliance, the next step
299. See, e.g., Peck et al., supra note 19.
300. For research that considered whether multiple immersions were significant in the context of using ava-
tars to reduce racial bias, see Banakou et al., supra note 18, at 3, 7.
301. Yaroshefsky, supra note 7.
302. Research suggests that even open-file policies may not be enough to address the concerns Brady was
designed to alleviate, see Grunwald, supra note 77, at 771, 826, but that concern is beyond the scope of this
Article.
303. In designing the experiment, we will also have to be conscious of the risk of social desirability effects,
efforts of the participants to deliver results that they perceive as positively correlated with socially acceptable
responses (and perhaps those that participants anticipate that the researchers are seeking). Cf. Salmanowitz,
Impact of Virtual Reality, supra note 26, at 178.
304. BAILENSON, supra note 20, at 9, 253 54 (discussing "simulator sickness"); see also Ticknor &
Tillinghast, supra note 195, at 31 (discussing several symptoms associated with "cybersickness" including
"headache, paleness, sweating, dryness of mouth, disorientation, and vertigo" and suggesting screening proto-
col for study participants). Professor Bailenson also enumerates drawbacks to virtual reality more generally.
BAILENSON, supra note 20, at 250 58.
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will involve advocacy. It will be up to all of us, individually and collectively,
within and without prosecutors' offices, to encourage prosecutors to engage with
the research. More established institutional or organizational incentives might
also play a role. Lobbying prosecutorial organizations to encourage participation
and to fund travel to training sites might also increase engagement. Modest
bonuses, like an extra vacation day, for prosecutors who engage in the virtual
reality immersion could also enhance participation.0 5
CONCLUSION
Prosecutorial failure to disclose evidence favorable to the accused under Brady
imperils justice and has caused lifetimes of harm. Scholars attribute much of this
failure to cognitive biases that can cloud a prosecutor's thinking process once a
Guilt Perspective takes root in a prosecutor's mind. Research has demonstrated
that perspective taking can modify a participant's viewpoint and mitigate cogni-
tive bias. Digital avatars represent a particularly potent approach to perspective
taking. They hold much promise as a method to disrupt the Guilt Perspective so
that prosecutors will be better able to appreciate evidence as favorable to the
accused and be inclined to disclose such evidence in a criminal case. Whether that
promise can be realized involves designing and implementing research to test the
relevant hypothesis: that an immersive experience can dislodge or delay entrench-
ment of a Guilt Perspective and enhance prosecutorial recognition of evidence that
is favorable to the accused and encourage prosecutors to disclose that evidence.
The analysis in this Article distilled at least three approaches to experimental
design. First, to enhance self-other overlap and empathy generation as an antidote
to a too-firmly-entrenched Guilt Perspective, one approach might embody the
prosecutor in a "defendant" avatar. A second could place the prosecutor in a
defense counsel avatar. Third, if a virtual reward condition might motivate prose-
cutors to divulge Brady material, an experiment to encourage that behavior could
also be developed. For each of these, a number of components of the protocols of
the IVE research described above could be modified to provide the basic founda-
tion for an immersive environment that enabled a prosecutor to experience the
world as a person accused of crime or as defense counsel or to be rewarded for
appropriate Brady disclosure. Unlike for race and age studies, instead of using the
IAT, evaluation of successful reduction of cognitive biases might involve pre-
and post-immersion Brady compliance tasks. Designing appropriate research
protocols represents the next challenge in this endeavor to harness the power of
digital avatars to reduce Brady error injustice.
305. For a discussion more generally of the possibility of financial incentives to encourage Brady disclosure,
see Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with
Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 851, 910 (1995) ("A prosecutor would receive a reward for proper
behavior only if a reviewing court finds that the prosecution did not fail to turn over evidence that was favorable
to the defense, whether or not the reviewing court ultimately finds that the favorable evidence was material.").
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